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PUBLIC NUISANCE SUITS FOR THE CLIMATE JUSTICE
MOVEMENT: THE RIGHT THING AND THE RIGHT
TIME
Randall S. Abate*
Abstract: The climate justice movement seeks to provide relief to vulnerable
communities that have been disproportionately affected by climate change impacts. Public
nuisance litigation for climate change impacts is a new and growing field that could provide
the legal and policy underpinnings to help secure a viable foundation for climate justice in
the United States and internationally. By securing victories in the court system, these suits
may succeed where the domestic environmental justice movement failed in seeking to merge
environmental protection and human rights concerns into an actionable legal theory. This
Article first examines the nature and scope of the climate change impacts that are affecting
vulnerable populations throughout the world. It then traces the evolution of public nuisance
claims for climate change impacts, discusses the Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil
Corp. case as a turning point in the evolution of these claims, and considers what obstacles
remain on the path toward success for Kivalina and similar suits in the United States and
abroad. The Kivalina case involves the right set of facts and legal theories to afford a remedy
to victims who are disproportionately affected by climate change. Ultimately, the Kivalina
litigation could help to institutionalize climate justice claims as part of the post-Kyoto
Protocol framework by recognizing a private right to be free from climate change impacts
that threaten the sustainability of vulnerable communities.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change is here to stay. The questions of whether climate
change is happening and what the international community can do to
respond to it are no longer the predominant focus of domestic and
international climate change law and policy discussions. The
international community made significant progress in addressing the
global climate change problem with the Kyoto Protocol,1 which

1. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force
Feb. 16, 2005).
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responded to the causes of global climate change with ambitious targets
and timetables for the parties’ reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.2
However, ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, a controversial and multifaceted instrument, was only the first step in tackling this daunting and
omnipresent global crisis. The international community is now
confronting an indefinite “period of consequences”3 from climate change
impacts. Accordingly, the new question at the forefront of the climate
change policy debate in the post-Kyoto era4 is what legal remedies will
be most effective to mitigate and adapt to these impacts.5
In the context of climate change adaptation, the climate justice
movement has emerged as a mechanism to address the rights of the
victims of climate change impacts.6 Climate justice embraces a human
rights approach to advocating for rights and remedies for climate
change.7 Rather than focusing on the climate change phenomenon itself,
climate justice focuses on the rights of those disproportionately affected
by the impacts of climate change.8 The challenge in seeking to
2. Id., art. 3.
3. Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as Public Nuisance, 26A STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 77, 77 (2007).
4. The Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. Kyle W. Danish, The International Regime, in GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 31, 31 (Michael B. Gerrard, ed., Am. Bar Ass’n 2007). The
international community’s first step toward developing a post-Kyoto treaty regime is embodied in
the Copenhagen Accord, which was drafted in December 2009 at the Fifteenth Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Though merely a nonbinding political agreement, the Accord reflects the shift in focus to adaptation by recognizing the
disproportionate climate change impacts that developing countries now endure and establishing a
fund to address adaptation to those impacts. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
Conference of the Parties, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7–19, 2009, Copenhagen Accord, arts. 1, 2, 3, 6,
7, 8, and 10, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf#page=4.pdf [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord].
5. David Hunter, The Implications of Climate Change Litigation for International Environmental
Law-Making, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL
APPROACHES 357, 358 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009).
6. For a discussion of the basic principles of the climate justice movement, see generally Alice
Kaswan, Justice in a Warming World, 26 ENVTL. FORUM 48, 48–70 (2009).
7. See generally Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The Impact of
Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625 (2007) (arguing for recognition of an indigenous right
to environmental self-determination, which would allow indigenous peoples to maintain their
cultural and political status in their traditional lands and would impose affirmative requirements on
nation-states to engage in a mitigation strategy to avoid catastrophic harm to indigenous peoples).
8. See generally Sara C. Aminzadeh, A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Implications of
Climate Change, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 231 (2007); Sumudu Ataputtu, Global
Climate Change: Can Human Rights (and Human Beings) Survive This Onslaught?, 20 COLO. J.
INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 35 (2008); Jessie Hohmann, Igloo as Icon: A Human Rights Approach to
Climate Change for the Inuit?, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 295 (2009); Int’l Council
on Human Rights, Climate Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide (2008),
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implement a human rights-based response to this problem is that such an
approach is notoriously difficult to enforce, both domestically and
internationally.
The climate justice movement stands to gain a great deal if it could
use common-law enforcement mechanisms as a bootstrap to lay a
foundation for a codified framework of climate justice rights and
remedies in domestic and international law instruments. Legislative
responses at the national and regional levels that implement cooperative
international solutions to the climate change problem are best, but such
solutions take time and leave gaps. For example, the negotiations for the
post-Kyoto regime will likely address climate justice concerns at some
level, but will inevitably leave gaps regarding how victims of climate
change impacts may seek recourse to protect their rights to selfdetermination.9
At least in the near future, common law mechanisms will continue to
be the most viable options to ensure adequate forms of relief for the
victims of climate change impacts in the United States and elsewhere.
Public nuisance claims have been one of the most prominent forms of
common-law-based climate change litigation. These suits have evolved
in three stages, which are reflected in several cases. The first stage in
this sequence involved a suit by state attorneys general on behalf of
citizens against major power companies for injunctive relief to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.10 The second stage involved the same class of
plaintiffs—state attorneys general led by California—against major
automobile manufacturers for damages for climate change impacts in
California.11 Currently, the third stage, and most important for purposes
of this Article, involves suits by individual plaintiffs for climate change
impacts that they experienced directly in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina,12 and in the form of coastal erosion impacts in the Native
Village of Kivalina, Alaska.13

http://www.ichrp.org/en/projects/136.
9. For example, after years of negotiations focusing on climate change adaptation concerns in
developing countries, the Copenhagen Accord drafted in December 2009 only scratched the surface
of the climate change adaptation challenges that developing countries now face. See Copenhagen
Accord, supra note 4. For a discussion of the relevant provisions of the Copenhagen Accord and
how they leave much to be desired in providing viable climate justice relief, see infra Part IV.B.
10. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d
309 (2d Cir. 2009). For a discussion of Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., see infra Part
II.B.1.
11. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007). For a discussion of California v. General Motors Corporation, see infra Part II.B.2.
12. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009). For a discussion of Comer v.
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Public nuisance suits for climate change impacts have been
controversial to say the least. Public nuisance suits seeking damages
from lead paint manufacturers, when applied in the climate change
litigation context, have been referred to as “alchemy in the courtroom”14
and, in a related vein, as “[p]erhaps the most innovative but problematic
litigation strategy being pursued.”15 Nevertheless, public nuisance suits
in the climate litigation context can help the cause of climate justice by
helping to secure human rights-based relief for those disproportionately
affected by climate change impacts.16
Part I of this Article examines the nature and scope of climate change
impacts to vulnerable populations throughout the world and how the
climate justice movement emerged to respond to the plight of these
victimized populations. Part II traces the evolution of public nuisance
claims for climate change issues, beginning with the federal common
law of interstate pollution as the foundation for such claims. Part III
discusses the Kivalina case17 as a turning point in public nuisance claims
for climate change impacts. It first addresses how the plaintiffs’
litigation strategy in Kivalina builds on and learns from the public
nuisance cases that preceded it, and then considers what obstacles
remain for Kivalina-like litigation to be viable in the future.
Part IV concludes that the Kivalina case involves the right set of facts
and legal theories to afford a remedy to this class of victims of climate
change impacts without opening the door too far for future litigants.
Theories of relief originally enshrined in successful, albeit piecemeal,
common law actions represent a small and necessary first step to sound a
warning bell and provide some relief to vulnerable populations affected
by climate change impacts. More importantly, the Kivalina case also
could help lay a foundation for possible long-term, institutionalized
frameworks at the international level to address on a broader scale the
rights of populations disproportionately affected by climate change.
Such an opportunity could mirror and capitalize on the evolution of
Murphy Oil USA, see infra Part II.B.3.
13. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
14. Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom? The Transmutation of Public
Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941, 941 (2007).
15. Kevin Haroff & Jacqueline Hartis, Climate Change and the Courts: Litigating the Causes and
Consequences of Global Warming, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 50, 55 (2007–2008).
16. Hunter, supra note 5, at 357, 360. But see Shi-Ling Hsu, A Realistic Evaluation of Climate
Change Litigation Through the Lens of a Hypothetical Lawsuit, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 701, 701
(2008) (discussing the Inuit as strong plaintiffs and electric companies as vulnerable defendants, and
how even with those ideal parties the prospect of successful climate litigation is bleak).
17. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863.
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citizen suits under federal environmental laws by institutionalizing a
private right to be free from climate change impacts that threaten the
sustainability of vulnerable communities in a post-Kyoto world.
I.

CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND THE NEED FOR THE
CLIMATE JUSTICE MOVEMENT

This section of the Article first considers the nature and scope of
climate change impacts on vulnerable populations throughout the world.
It then examines the evolution of climate justice and traces its origins to
the environmental justice movement in the United States and to the everincreasing interplay between human rights and the environment in
international law.
A.

The Nature and Scope of Climate Change Impacts on Vulnerable
Populations

Devastating climate change impacts have been projected for some
time now. In 2000, scientists predicted temperature increases of up to
10.8 degrees Fahrenheit and sea levels rising thirty-one inches in the
next century.18 These escalations were attributed to heat-trapping
emissions from industrial pollution and car exhaust.19 Effects of this
trend include, for example, atolls becoming inundated, coral reef
erosion, rising seas threatening fresh water supplies, destruction of
infrastructure, and intensified storm systems.20
These predictions have become a reality. In fact, for some vulnerable
areas and populations, it is already too late for a meaningful legal
response to climate change impacts. For example, Lohachara Island, in
India’s part of the Sundarbans, was the first inhabited island to be
claimed by rising seas; this left 10,000 inhabitants homeless.21 In
addition, some of the uninhabited islands of Kiribati, a Pacific atoll
nation, and Suparibhanga, Lohachara’s neighbor, have been lost.22 Onehalf of the populated island of Ghoramara also has been permanently
inundated, and more of the island is expected to be inundated in the near
18. Jerome Socolovsky, Island Nations Desperate for Action on Global Warming, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 17, 2000, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/111700-01.htm.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Geoffrey Lean, Disappearing World: Global Warming Claims Tropical Island, THE
INDEPENDENT, Dec. 24, 2006, http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/
disappearing-world-global-warming-claims-tropical-island-429764.html.
22. Id.
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future.23 In total, a dozen islands, inhabited by 70,000 residents, are
considered to be in danger of being swallowed by the sea.24 Other areas
in the Indian Ocean are similarly threatened by climate change impacts.
Waves threaten the coastline of Zanzibar,25 and Bangladesh bears the
risk of overflowing rivers and rising seas.26 In the Maldives alone, sixty
percent of the 194 inhabited islands of the archipelago are currently
facing varying degrees of erosion.27
These climate change impacts also threaten other low-lying areas of
the world. In the North Sea, Sylt, the largest German Frisian island, has
lost 800,000 cubic meters of sand from its beaches.28 In the Pacific
Ocean, Micronesia has lost islets; Fiji is experiencing reduced rainfall,
coastal erosion, and coral bleaching; an eight-foot sea wall cannot
prevent an airport from flooding in the Marshall Islands; and populations
are being displaced in Vanuatu and Tuvalu.29
Should global warming continue at its present rate, an estimated 2,000
Torres Strait Islanders would be displaced to the Australian mainland
later this century.30 Global sea levels are projected to rise twenty-six to
fifty-nine centimeters by 2100.31 The islands are highly susceptible to
these proposed conditions due to their low elevation, some parts only
being one meter above sea level.32 The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report determined that the
Torres Straits will be among the “most vulnerable regions” to climate
change in Australia.33
The indigenous peoples of Australia also must confront the harsh
realities of global warming. Current climate projections for the next fifty

23. Somini Sungupta, Sea’s Rise in India Buries Islands and a Way of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/1 1/world/asia/11india.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
24. Lean, supra note 21.
25. Fredrica Boswell, Waves Threaten Zanzibar Paradise, BBC NEWS, Dec. 13, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7100107.stm.
26. Catherine Jacob, Vanishing Islands of Bangladesh: Climate Change Toll, SKY NEWS, Feb.
27, 2008, http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Sky-News-Archive/Article/20080641296130.
27. Simon Gardner, Interview-Sea May Swallow Maldives if Global Warming Unchecked,
REUTERS, Feb. 3, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSCOL104974.
28. Julio Godoy, Climate Change: Islands Could Fall off the Map, IPS NEWS, Feb. 17, 2007,
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36618.
29. Global Islands Network, Disappearing Islands, http://www.globalislands.net/news/
newsdeskitem.php?newstype=Special&newsid=4660&mfxsr=8 (last visited Aug. 10, 2009).
30. Id. at Part I.
31. Id.
32. Id. at Part II C.
33. Id.
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years in northern Australia include higher temperatures, more extreme
rainfall, sea level rise, and more intense cyclones.34 Potential
consequences include the erosion and saltwater inundation of long
sections of coastline, river deltas, wetland areas, and offshore islands,
while inland areas are likely to have more bushfires, dust storms,
flooding, droughts, and extremes in temperatures.35 These changes to the
surrounding environment will have detrimental effects on these naturalresource-dependent peoples.36 Rising temperatures and precipitation can
result in increased heat stress, respiratory diseases, communicable
diseases, and mosquito-borne diseases, such as Dengue.37 Sea level rise
and coastal erosion can destroy homes and infrastructure,38 while the
destruction of agriculture and ceremonial sites can harm a people’s
livelihood and culture.39 These potential harms could be realized unless
immediate action is taken to prevent them.
These impacts have caused a new era of environmental refugeeism.40
As of this writing, there are approximately twenty-five million
environmental refugees around the world.41 Poor crop yields in Mexico
are exacerbating the existing problem of Mexican citizens illegally
crossing the border into the United States.42 Drought in northeast Brazil
is forcing one in every five people born there to leave their homeland to
avoid drought.43 The Gobi Desert is slowly devouring 4000 square miles
34. DONNA GREEN, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HEALTH: IMPACTS ON REMOTE INDIGENOUS
COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN AUSTRALIA, 1 CSIRO Marine and Atmospheric Research Paper 012,
§ 1.4 (2006), available at http://www.sharingknowledge.net.au/files/climateimpacts_health_
report.pdf.
35. Id.
36. David S.G. Thomas & Chasca Twyman, Equity and Justice in Climate Change Adaptation
Amongst Natural-Resource-Dependent Societies, 15 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 115, 115 (2005),
available
at
http://www.astepback.com/GCC/Equity%20and%20Justice%20in%20CC%20
Adaptation.pdf. These populations are subsistence-based communities, often comprised of
indigenous peoples, and are on the front-line of climate change impacts because of a lack of
infrastructure and because they often reside close to the sea for fishing. Id.
37. GREEN, supra note 34, § 1.4.
38. Id. §§ 1.4, 1.5.
39. Id. § 1.4.
40. See generally Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for
a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349 (2009).
41. Jordan Tchilingirian, Global Warming Is Creating Climate Change Refugees Says Christian
Agency, EKKLESIA, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/content/news_syndication/
article_061019refugees.shtml.
42. Id.
43. Id.; see also Seren Boyd & Rachel Roach, Feeling the Heat: A Report from Tearfund 5, 15
(2006), http://www.tearfund.org/webdocs/Website/News/Feeling%20the%20Heat%20Tearfund%
20report.pdf.
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per year of the inhabitable lands that lie next to it in China.44 In Nigeria
alone, 1350 square miles of land are converted to desert each year,
forcing farmers and others dependent on agriculture to flee to urban
areas.45
More specific examples of climate change migration have taken place
in the Republic of Kiribati and Tuvalu, two low-lying atoll nations in the
Pacific region.46 Although it has been difficult to pinpoint the causes for
population movements from rural-outer-islands to urban-central islands,
there is strong evidence that environmental factors play an important
role.47 Sea level rise, influxes of drought, loss of land, unreliable food
and water supplies, and general health decline have all contributed to
these movements.48 In Kiribati, more than half of the population resides
in the Gilbert Island group, where the capital of South Tarawa is
located.49 The Southern Gilbert Islands have been overwhelmed by long
periods of drought and shorter periods of rainfall.50 The Southern
Gilberts can have as little as 360 millimeters of rain per year in
comparison to the 2,400 millimeters typical for the Northern Gilberts.51
Population movements have also been correlated to increased potable
water scarcity, influxes of drought, coral reef depletion, and coastal
erosion on outer islands.52 In Tuvalu, owners of coastal lands that had
become increasingly salinated by the encroaching sea had to relocate to
the makeshift settlement of Fongafale on Funafuti.53 If current global
climate trends are allowed to continue, an increasing number of island
communities will be forced to leave their homes.
The United States also has been unable to avoid the grim reality of
climate change induced migration. In fact, the largest example of this
phenomenon has occurred on American soil. Millions of Gulf Coast
residents were forced to abandon their homes and seek shelter elsewhere
when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in August 2005.54 Large
44. Tchilingirian, supra note 41.
45. Id.
46. Justin Locke, Climate Change-Induced Migration in the Pacific Region: Sudden Crisis and
Long Term Developments, 175 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 171 (2009).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1.
49. Id. at 1, 9.
50. Id. at 12–13.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 176, 177.
54. Lester R. Brown, Global Warming Forcing U.S. Coastal Population to Move Inland:
Estimated 250,000 Katrina Evacuees Are Now Climate Refugees (Aug. 16, 2006),
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parts of the city still face major challenges due to blight, unaffordable
housing, and infrastructure issues. According to the Brookings
Institution Metropolitan Policy Program and the Greater New Orleans
Community Data Center, “[a]s of June 2009, nine neighborhoods still
have less than half of the active residential addresses they did before
Katrina.”55 The scale of abandonment remains high in New Orleans, St.
Bernard, and Jefferson parishes with 65,888; 14,372; and 11,516
unoccupied residences, respectively.56 Housing affordability continues to
be a pressing challenge for many critical workers and lower income
residents trying to return to local neighborhoods where rents are at an
all-time high.57 Furthermore, public transportation and other community
services such as childcare are operating at a fraction of pre-storm
operation levels.58
Climate change induced devastation also has plagued indigenous
peoples in Alaska. Increased temperatures in the Arctic have diminished
the thickness, extent, and duration of sea ice that forms along the coast
of Kivalina,59 located at the tip of a six-mile long barrier reef,
approximately seventy miles north of the Arctic Circle on the northwest
coast of Alaska.60 Without the protection formerly provided by sea ice
and land-fast sea ice, Kivalina has become vulnerable to destruction
from waves, storm surges, and erosion.61 The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Alaska District, confirmed these changes in an April 2006
report stating that due to global climate change, the Chukchi Sea was
less likely to be frozen during winter storms.62 Additionally, in
December 2003, the United States Government Accountability Office
(GAO) reported that “the right combination of storm events could flood
the entire village at any time.”63

http://www.earthpolicy.org/index.php?/plan_b_updates/2006/update57#.
55. THE BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM & GREATER NEW ORLEANS CMTY. DATA
CTR., THE NEW ORLEANS INDEX: TRACKING RECOVERY OF NEW ORLEANS 18 (Aug. 2009),
https://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/NOLAIndex/NOLAIndex.pdf.
56. Id. at 6.
57. GCR & Assocs., Inc., The New Orleans Region 4 Years After Katrina: A Focus on Recovery
3 (2009), http://www.gcrconsulting.com/downloads/Katrina%20Four%20Year%20Ann.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Complaint for Damages at 45, Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (No. CV08-1138 SBA).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 45–46.
63. Id.
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Due to the amount of erosion that Kivalina has already endured, and
its increased vulnerability to continued damage, the GAO has
determined that remaining on the island is no longer a viable option for
the community.64
The Native Village of Kivalina is a self-governing, federally
recognized Inupiat Eskimo village65 of approximately 400 people who
reside in the city of Kivalina, Alaska.66 The ongoing destruction of
Kivalina property has necessitated the relocation of the entire village.67
The Army Corps of Engineers projects the cost of relocation to be
between $95 and $125 million,68 whereas the GAO estimates that it will
cost between $100 and $400 million.69 The Village of Kivalina will face
devastation should the community not be relocated.70
On September 13, 2008, Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska)
remarked that her state is at the “tip of the spear” of climate change in
the United States.71 This metaphor effectively captures the plight of
vulnerable populations on the front line of climate change impacts. The
Kivalina litigation seeks to secure a remedy for one such vulnerable
population and, in turn, can help inspire and lay a foundation for a new
era of legal remedies for similarly situated victims domestically and
internationally.72
B.

Climate Justice as a Response to the Plight of Vulnerable
Populations

Climate justice has both domestic and international law
underpinnings. First, the evolution of environmental justice in the United
States helped lay a foundation for the climate justice field by
recognizing an area outside of the traditional boundaries of
environmental law for which the law should provide a remedy—namely,
the disproportionate impacts of environmental regulation on minority
and low-income communities.73 This theory encountered some obstacles
64. Id.
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id. at 1.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 46.
70. Id. at 45–46.
71. Margaret Kriz, Swept Away, NAT’L J., Sept. 13, 2008, at 44.
72. For a discussion of the Kivalina litigation and its implications for enhancing climate justice
relief domestically and internationally, see infra Parts III, IV.
73. The international law framework can also influence domestic approaches to environmental
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when tested in the federal courts under Equal Protection Clause analysis
and it ultimately failed to secure remedies for such disproportionate
impacts through the court system.74 The litigation was not in vain,
however, as it raised awareness of the need for a response to this
inequity and prompted subsequent proactive measures at the federal and
state levels to mitigate or avoid such disproportionate impacts in the
future.75
Beyond the realm of environmental justice in the United States, a
parallel development under international law evolved concerning the
growing recognition of the intersection between environmental law and
human rights.76 The rise of the notion of sustainable development has
helped fuel this awareness, and scenarios involving unsustainable
growth that caused disproportionate impacts on indigenous populations
(such as deforestation and development in the Amazon) have drawn
international attention. More recently, climate change has created the
potential for cultural genocide77 or may at least require the relocation of
these peoples.78
At the international level, the movement to recognize a human right to
a healthy environment has enjoyed decades of support, and has increased
significantly with the increase in awareness regarding climate change
impacts. More specifically, the importance of the right to a healthy

justice. See generally, e.g., Maxine Burkette, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice
Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169 (2008) (arguing for
application of a component of the international environmental law framework, the Clean
Development Mechanism from the Kyoto Protocol, to domestic environmental justice
circumstances).
74. See generally Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that Title VI does not
create a private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations); S. Camden Citizens in
Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the EPA’s disparate
impact regulations do not create a right enforceable under section 1983).
75. See, e.g., Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations, Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (2006) requiring federal agencies to administer their programs, policies, and activities that
affect human health or the environment in a manner that avoids, to the maximum extent possible,
“disproportionately high and adverse” effects on minority and low-income populations).
76. Angela Williams, Promoting Justice within the International Legal System: Prospects for
Climate Refugees, in CLIMATE LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LEGAL AND POLICY
CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 84, 84 (Benjamin J. Richardson, et al., eds., 2009).
77. “Cultural genocide” in this context refers to the loss of cultural values and traditions due to
environmental devastation. See AFP, Climate Change ‘Cultural Genocide’ for Aborigines, May 4,
2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jZHYtI_h8rs0_K_iTK470lQ57hMA
(“Rising sea levels and soaring temperatures would make their homelands uninhabitable, severing
spiritual links and laying waste to the environment.”).
78. See supra Part I.
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environment in developing nations has attracted attention,79 especially in
developing nations that are either particularly vulnerable
environmentally to climate change, or that lack the infrastructure to
respond adequately to such threats.80
The latest climate change science confirms the importance of an
institutionalized climate justice framework as part of the post-Kyoto
regime. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) released
a report in September 2009 entitled Climate Change Science
Compendium 2009.81 This UNEP report underscores the need for
immediate action to avoid the catastrophic climate change impacts that
are projected by 2100, as well as the dangerous “tipping points” that
could be reached within a few decades that would have tragic
implications for the world’s major ecosystems, such as the Sahara and
the Amazon.82 The report notes that it still may be possible to avoid
many of these catastrophic impacts, but only if there is “effective,
efficient, and equitable” action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
states take proactive measures to assist vulnerable countries adapt to the
projected impacts.83
Responding to the needs of vulnerable communities is not a “one size
fits all” proposition. For example, the impacts of climate change on
indigenous peoples raise difficult legal and ethical issues. Professor
Rebecca Tsosie has suggested that the standard adaptation strategy of
relocating a vulnerable population out of harm’s way could be culturally
genocidal for many groups of indigenous people when viewed in the
climate justice context.84 As an alternative, she argues for recognition of
an indigenous right to environmental self-determination, which would
allow indigenous peoples to maintain their cultural and political status
upon their traditional lands.85 In the context of climate change policy,
79. See, e.g., TIM HAYWARD, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 200–15 (2005)
(discussing the value of establishing constitutional environmental rights for poorer societies); Amy
Sinden, An Emerging Human Right to Security from Climate Change: The Case Against Gas
Flaring in Nigeria, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 5, at 173 (examining theories
under which a right to security from climate change could be grounded in human rights theory and
how such rights might be applied to impose liability on a private multinational corporation).
80. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (UNFCCC), CLIMATE
CHANGE: IMPACTS, VULNERABILITIES AND ADAPTATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5–6 (2007),
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/impacts.pdf.
81. U.N. Environment Programme, Climate Change Science Compendium 2009,
http://www.unep.org/compendium2009/ (offering the full text of the report).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 51.
84. See generally Tsosie, supra note 7.
85. Id. at 1657–74.
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such a right would impose affirmative requirements on nation-states to
develop a plan to avoid catastrophic harm to indigenous peoples.86
Tsosie further recognizes that tort-based theories of compensation for
the harms of climate change have only limited capacity to address the
concerns of indigenous peoples.87 Ultimately, public nuisance claims in
Kivalina-like scenarios are an important step, but only the beginning.
II.

PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS AS A FOUNDATION FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE
RELIEF

To understand how public nuisance suits can enhance the opportunity
for climate justice remedies domestically and internationally, it is
necessary to examine the origin and evolution of these claims leading up
to the Kivalina case. This Part discusses the narrow, but secure federal
common-law foundation of interstate pollution jurisprudence, which
underlies public nuisance claims for climate change impacts. It then
traces the three-part evolution of public nuisance suits for climate
change impacts.
A.

Historical and Conceptual Foundations of Interstate Pollution
Claims

An important threshold question is whether public nuisance claims for
climate change impacts are justiciable. Climate change impacts are a
form of interstate pollution. Although almost exclusively regulated by
federal statutes, interstate pollution is also subject to federal commonlaw claims that trace their origins to two foundational cases: Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co.88 and Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee
I).89
In 1907, in the landmark case of Tennessee Copper, the state of
Georgia sought an injunction against Tennessee Copper for the
company’s sulfur dioxide emissions, which were transported by wind

86. Id. at 1674.
87. Id. at 1675.
88. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
89. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). For a helpful discussion of the role of Milwaukee I and City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981), in interstate pollution cases, see generally Matthew
F. Pawa, This Town Ain’t Big Enough for the Two of Us: Interstate Pollution and Federalism under
Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II, 2009 A.B.A. SEC. ENV’T., ENERGY, AND RES. 121, available at
http://www.abanet.org/environ/programs/keystone/2009/bestpapers/
MatthewPawa_Keystone2009.pdf. See infra note 157 for a discussion of the Milwaukee II case.
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and detrimentally affected five counties in Georgia.90 These injuries
included the destruction of forests, orchards, and crops.91 Although
Georgia was not the private property owner of these affected regions, the
Court determined that the state “has an interest independent of and
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its
domain.”92 The Court further stated that Georgia had the final word as to
the protection and maintenance of its natural resources.93 The creation of
the United States had not precluded states from protecting these quasisovereign interests.94 Rather, the Court reasoned, a state in such a
situation “is somewhat more certainly entitled to specific relief than a
private party might be.”95
The Court noted that the traditional means of equitably balancing the
harm between private parties cannot be applied when at least one party is
a state.96 A state should not be required to relinquish its quasi-sovereign
rights for compensation.97 It is “fair” and “reasonable” that a state
demand that its resources be left unharmed.98 In Tennessee Copper,
neither the injuries caused by, nor the conduct of, the defendants was
contested.99 The Court issued an injunction against the company.100
Therefore, Tennessee Copper established the principle that a state
subjected to interstate air pollution is able to seek injunctive relief from
an emissions source in a neighboring state that caused the pollution
problem. This premise sets one of the pillars in place for public nuisance
cases for climate change impacts because such impacts are the product
of the interstate, indeed global, phenomenon of climate change.
In 1972, in Milwaukee I, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the
second foundational case concerning interstate pollution, which involved
a water pollution dispute.101 Illinois alleged that four cities in Wisconsin
were polluting Lake Michigan, an interstate body of water. While

90. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 237.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 238.
97. Id. at 237.
98. Id. at 238.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 239.
101. 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).
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Illinois had prohibited the pollution at issue on its side of the lake,
Wisconsin had not.102
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA, also known as the
Clean Water Act),103 rather than state law, controls interstate water
pollution claims.104 Milwaukee I required application of federal common
law, with some deference to state law, because the federal law only sets
a floor.105 States are given time to create their own water standards
above this floor, but if they are unable to do so, the federal government
may step in and ask the state to abate the pollution.106 Federal common
law is applied “where there is an overriding federal interest in the need
for a uniform rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic
interests of federalism.”107
Interstate water pollution claims, like the one at issue in Milwaukee I,
are public nuisance claims. When one state causes a public nuisance in
another state, injunctive relief is available.108 In Milwaukee I, the Court
concluded that federal district courts have jurisdiction over interstate
water pollution disputes that allegedly create a public nuisance, and that
the Supreme Court has the discretion to remit such disputes to
appropriate federal district courts for resolution.109 The Court reasoned
that although the remedies Illinois sought for apportioning interstate
waters were not authorized under the FWPCA, the application of federal
common law was consistent with the FWPCA.110 It noted that while
federal environmental protection statutes are sources of federal law, they
do not necessarily represent the exclusive scope of federal law.111 Until
new federal laws preempt the federal common law of nuisance, federal
courts will balance the equities in public nuisance suits regarding
interstate water pollution.112
Relief for interstate pollution is also available to state plaintiffs under
state public nuisance laws. For example, in North Carolina v. Tennessee

102. Id.
103. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
104. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 102.
105. Id. at 107.
106. Id. at 102.
107. Id. at 105 n.6 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421–27 (1964)).
108. Id. at 106 n.8 (quoting North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923)).
109. Id. at 108.
110. Id. at 103–04.
111. Id. at 103 n.5, 107 n.9.
112. Id. at 107.
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Valley Authority (North Carolina II),113 North Carolina sued the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) on behalf of its citizens alleging that
the TVA’s use of coal-fired power plants constituted a public
nuisance.114 North Carolina alleged it was harmed by nitrogen, sulfur
dioxide, mercury, and other secondary pollutants from the TVA’s
emissions in neighboring states.115 It claimed that these emissions
constituted a public nuisance in the form of air pollution which, after
being emitted in other states, travels into North Carolina and threatens
the citizens’ health, the state’s economy, and the aesthetics of the
region.116
North Carolina sought injunctive relief because the cost of abating the
nuisance would be very high.117 It filed suit in federal court under the
Clean Air Act (CAA)118 “savings clause,” which allows the court to
proceed under state public nuisance laws.119 The court concluded that it
had jurisdiction over the complaint and the injunctive relief sought, but
noted that this type of disagreement must be settled based on the state
law of each plant’s locale, not a system-wide cap which could infringe
on the powers of the legislative or executive branches.120
The TVA is a federal entity and the largest public electricity system in
the United States, servicing large portions of Tennessee, Kentucky,
Mississippi, and Alabama, and portions of Georgia, North Carolina, and
Virginia.121 It owns and operates eleven plants, seven of which are in
Tennessee, two of which are in Kentucky, and two of which are in
Alabama.122 The TVA made three primary arguments to disclaim
responsibility for the alleged public nuisance. First, although the
emissions entered North Carolina, the harm alleged was mostly due to
North Carolina’s own emissions; second, the TVA’s conduct was
reasonable because its service is a necessity for millions who rely on less
expensive energy; and third, the TVA has made efforts to reduce
113. 593 F. Supp. 2d 812 (W.D.N.C. 2009).
114. Id. at 815.
115. Id. at 818–28.
116. Id. at 815.
117. Id.
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006).
119. See North Carolina II, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 816 (citing North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth.
(North Carolina I), 549 F. Supp. 2d 725, 729 (2008)).
120. Id. at 816–17. But see Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009)
(allowing a public nuisance claim for injunctive relief to proceed against the six largest power
companies in the nation).
121. North Carolina II, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 818.
122. Id.
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emissions already, so the emissions entering North Carolina could not be
considered to be in “unreasonable amounts.”123
Given the TVA’s plant locations, the court applied the laws of
Alabama, Kentucky, and Tennessee.124 The court granted North
Carolina’s relief in part and denied it in part.125 Because the several
plants North Carolina included in its complaint were in a few different
states, the court analyzed each of the plants’ conduct separately based on
the public nuisance law of the state where the plants were located.126
These interstate pollution cases each involved states suing in a parens
patriae capacity. The Milwaukee I and Tennessee Copper cases firmly
established the federal common-law foundation upon which the public
nuisance cases for climate change rely. The North Carolina case
confirmed and extended this approach to interstate pollution dispute
resolution through the application of state public nuisance law under the
CAA’s savings clause. This firm foundation for resolving interstate
pollution disputes paved the way for public nuisance suits for climate
change impacts.
B.

The Three-Stage Evolution of Public Nuisance and Climate
Change

Drawing on the interstate pollution cases, the progression of public
nuisance claims for climate change impacts began with Connecticut v.
American Electric Power Co.,127 which involved states seeking
injunctive relief. It was subsequently refined in California v. General
Motors Corp.,128 in which the states adjusted their theory of the case and
sought damages rather than injunctive relief. This state-as-plaintiff

123. Id. at 815.
124. Id. at 829–34.
125. Id. at 831–34.
126. Id. at 817, 829–31. The court held that some of the plants were public nuisances to North
Carolina by their state’s public nuisance laws, while some were not. The injunctions granted varied
according to what controls the plant already employed. For plants that did not have scrubbers, the
court held that these pollution controls must be installed and maintained properly for emissions
reduction. Id. at 832. For plants that had broken scrubbers, or did not have enough to cover all the
emissions, the court held that these controls must be fixed or additional ones must be added. Id. The
court also applied an annual cap on emissions and required that TVA provide semi-annual
accounting to confirm its compliance. Id. at 832–34.
127. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). On November
5, 2009, the defendants filed for a petition for rehearing en banc before the Second Circuit. Petition
for Rehearing En Banc, Conn. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 05-5104-cv (2d Cir. filed Nov. 5, 2005),
available at http://www.bdlaw.com/assets/attachments/Connecticut%20v%20AEP%20Petition.pdf.
128. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
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foundation then evolved into a claim for damages in Comer v. Murphy
Oil USA,129 in which individual plaintiffs sought to recover for climate
change impacts to their communities.130
1.

First Stage: States Sought to Enjoin Greenhouse Gas Emissions
from the Private Sector in Connecticut v. American Electric Power
Co.

In American Electric Power, the district court dismissed the public
nuisance case brought by various states and nonprofit land trusts against
several power companies.131 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to
reduce the power companies’ greenhouse gas emissions contributing to
global warming.132 The threshold question in the case was whether the
relief that the plaintiffs sought presented a nonjusticiable political
question outside the scope of the court’s jurisdiction.133
The political question doctrine requires federal courts to avoid
deciding matters that are better left to the political branches to resolve.
However, the mere fact that the issues in a case arise in a politically
charged context does not convert a case into a nonjusticiable political
question.134
In Baker v. Carr,135 the Court established six independent factors to
determine whether a political question existed.136 The factors are:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4]
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches

129. 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009). On November 30, 2009, the defendants filed for a petition for
rehearing en banc before the Fifth Circuit. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA, No. 07-60756 (5th Cir. filed Nov. 30, 2009). See Jennifer Koons, Courts May Beat Congress,
U.N. to Punch on GHGs, GREENWIRE, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/
2009/12/17/2.
130. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the impacts of these cases on the political question
and standing doctrines.
131. Am. Electric Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 271.
134. See, e.g., Comer, 585 F.3d at 873.
135. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
136. Id. at 217.

AbateDTPed.doc (Do Not Delete)

216

5/17/2010 9:37 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:197

of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the
potentiality
of
embarrassment
from
multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.137
The factors from Baker v. Carr were not meant to serve as a stand-alone
definition of a “political question.” Rather, they are intended to guide
federal courts in deciding whether a question is entrusted by the
Constitution or federal laws exclusively to a federal political branch for
its decision.138
The district court in American Electric Power concluded that the case
presented a nonjusticiable political question because the court faced “the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”139 The court reasoned that the
scope and magnitude of the case touched on many areas of national and
international policy, which reflected the “transcendently legislative
nature” of the litigation.140 Furthermore, the court recognized the overall
complexity of such policy determinations by noting several past and
current actions (and deliberate inactions) of Congress and the executive
branch on the issue of climate change.141 Ultimately, the case was
dismissed because the injunctive relief sought required “identification
and balancing of economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national
security interests,” which the court determined to be a nonjusticiable
political question for the political branches, not the judiciary, to
address.142
On September 22, 2009, in a long-awaited and pleasantly surprising
decision for environmental plaintiffs, the Second Circuit vacated the
district court’s dismissal of the public nuisance claim,143 holding that the
district court had erred in dismissing the case on political question

137. Id.
138. Comer, 585 F.3d at 872 (“[I]f a party moving to dismiss under the political question doctrine
is unable to identify a constitutional provision or federal law that arguably commits a material issue
in the case exclusively to a political branch, the issue is clearly justiciable and the motion should be
denied without applying the Baker formulations.”).
139. 406 F. Supp. 2d, 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–
78 (2004)), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
140. Id. at 272.
141. Id. at 273.
142. Id. at 274.
143. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 393. See generally Richard Lazarus, A Huge Green Win in
the 2nd Circuit, 26 ENVTL. FORUM, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 14 (describing the outcome and reasoning
of the Second Circuit’s decision in American Electric Power and the challenges that the plaintiffs
face in the wake of the decision).
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grounds.144 The court further concluded that the plaintiffs had stated
valid claims under the federal common law of nuisance.145
On the political question issue, the court applied the six-factor test
established in Baker v. Carr. The court noted that Baker set a high bar
for nonjusticiability and that the Supreme Court has “only rarely” found
that a political question bars adjudication of an issue.146 Particularly
relevant to the court’s analysis was its discussion of the first and second
factors from the Baker test.147 The court described the first Baker factor
as the “dominant consideration in any political question inquiry.”148 It
rejected the defendants’ arguments that allowing the plaintiffs’ claims
would result in a national emissions policy or undermine the separation
of powers.149 The court stated:
Nowhere in their complaints do Plaintiffs ask the court to
fashion a comprehensive and far-reaching solution to global
climate change, a task that arguably falls within the purview of
the political branches. Instead, they seek to limit emissions from
six domestic coal-fired electricity plants on the ground that such
emissions constitute a public nuisance that they allege has
caused, is causing, and will continue to cause them injury.150
The court also rejected the defendants’ arguments that the
complexities involved in pollution control and climate change cases
made it impossible to apply meaningful legal standards to this case.151
The court reasoned that the defendants’ arguments were “undermined by
the fact that federal courts have successfully adjudicated complex
common law nuisance cases for over a century.”152 The court compared
the plaintiffs’ claims to several past complex interstate nuisance cases
that were considered to be judicially manageable.153 The Second Circuit
concluded that “[w]ell-settled principles of tort and public nuisance law
144. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 315.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 321.
147. Id. at 324–30. The first two factors of the Baker test are: “[1] a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962).
148. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 324 (quoting Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 831 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
149. Id. at 325.
150. Id. (citation omitted).
151. Id. at 326–30.
152. Id. at 326.
153. Id. at 326–30.
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provide appropriate guidance to the district court in assessing Plaintiffs’
claims and the federal courts are competent to deal with these issues.”154
When a federal court has jurisdiction, the fact that a case may present
complex issues is not an automatic reason for the court to shy away from
resolving the matter.
The court also held that the plaintiffs stated a valid claim under the
federal common law of nuisance.155 It rejected defendants’ contentions
that the plaintiffs’ public nuisance claims under federal common law
should be dismissed because of their breadth and factual complexity.156
Additionally, the court held that the CAA had not displaced157 a federal
common law of nuisance action because the EPA has not yet regulated
greenhouse gas emissions in such a way that “speaks directly” to the
issue that the plaintiffs raised.158
2.

Second Stage: States Sought Damages Rather than Injunctive
Relief in California v. General Motors Corp.

In California v. General Motors Corp., the district court dismissed the
claims brought by the State of California against various major
automakers for allegedly “creating, and contributing to, an alleged
public nuisance—global warming.”159 The State sought compensation
for current and future expenditures and damages it had incurred and
would continue to incur as a result of global warming.160
In its analysis, the court referenced a chronology of relevant
environmental policy actions taken by Congress and the executive
branch in addressing the complex issue of global warming.161 Against
this backdrop, the court examined the issue of whether the State’s claims
presented nonjusticiable political questions.162

154. Id. at 329.
155. Id. at 392.
156. Id. at 326.
157. The court distinguished Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), which held that the
comprehensive nature of the Clean Water Act had left no room for a federal common law of
nuisance action for water pollution (i.e., the Court concluded that the Act had “displaced” such
actions).
158. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 381 (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 319–24).
159. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *1, *16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) (granting
defendants’ motion to dismiss).
160. Id. at *2.
161. Id. at *3–5 (citing Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated,
582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009)).
162. Id. at *5–7.
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The court reviewed and applied several cases, including Baker v.
Carr, American Electric Power, and Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency,163 regarding the tests for justiciability of political
questions.164 Relying on these precedents, the court determined that it
could not “adjudicate Plaintiff’s federal common law global warming
nuisance tort claim without making an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”165 Furthermore, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims would have a significant effect on
interstate commerce and foreign policy, reiterating that such issues are
constitutionally committed to the political branches of government.166
California appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit.167 In seeking a sixmonth extension of the appeal, California stated that it would withdraw
its appeal if the federal government responded in the interim to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles or if any of the
defendants filed for bankruptcy.168 In 2009, both of these conditions
were met. First, the EPA “acknowledged that carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases are a public health danger and must be regulated.”169
In addition, “the President directed the Department of Transportation to
establish higher national fuel efficiency standards in line with the
standards California has sought to implement for the last several
years.”170 Second, defendants Chrysler and General Motors filed for
bankruptcy.171 Consequently, California voluntarily dismissed its appeal
on June 19, 2009.172
3.

Third Stage: Private Plaintiffs Sought Damages in Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA

In Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, the plaintiffs sued several energy
companies seeking relief for Hurricane Katrina-related property damage,
163. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
164. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *5–10.
165. Id. at *13.
166. Id. at *13–14.
167. Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal at 1, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 07-16908
(9th Cir. filed June 19, 2009), available at http://www.globalclimatelaw.com/uploads/file/
California%20v%20GM%20dismissal.pdf.
168. Id. at 2.
169. Id. (citing Declaration of Deputy Attorney General Harrison M. Pollak in Support of Motion
to Dismiss Appeal at ¶ 2, Gen. Motors Corp., No. 07-16908 [hereinafter Pollak Declaration]) .
170. Id. at 2–3 (citing Pollak Declaration ¶ 3, General Motors Corp., No. 07-16908).
171. Id. at 3 (citing Pollak Declaration at ¶ 4, General Motors Corp., No. 07-16908).
172. Id. at 4.
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which allegedly had been intensified by the defendants’ contributions to
global warming.173 The district court dismissed the case on standing and
political question grounds.174
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must satisfy three
requirements: (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is “concrete and
particularized” and that is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical;”175 (2) the injury must be “fairly trace[able]” to the
challenged action of the defendant;176 and (3) it must be “likely,” as
opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a
favorable decision.”177 The district court’s standing decision was based
on the determination that the alleged injuries were not “fairly
attributable” or “traceable” to the individual defendants.178
The district court addressed the political question issue by referencing
the many individual state statutes and programs that have been created to
address the issue of global warming.179 The purpose of this analysis was
to demonstrate that the issue involves not only a legitimate and
important debate, but one that “simply has no place in the court, until
such time as Congress enacts legislation which sets appropriate
standards by which this Court can measure conduct, whether it be
reasonable or unreasonable . . . .”180 The court concluded that such
policy decisions are best left to the legislative and executive branches of
government because they are in the best position to make such decisions
and are constitutionally empowered to do so.181
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and concluded that the plaintiffs
had standing and that the public nuisance claim could proceed because it
was not a political question.182 In its standing analysis, the court focused
on causation. It stated that the Article III traceability requirement “need
not be as close as the proximate causation needed to succeed on the
merits of a tort claim. Rather, an indirect causal relationship will suffice,
173. Transcript of Hearing of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 18–20, 23, Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA, No. 1:05CV436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007) [hereinafter
Transcript].
174. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009).
175. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
176. Id. at 560–61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)).
177. Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 41–42).
178. Transcript, supra note 170, at 36.
179. Id. at 36–39.
180. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 860 n.2 (5th Cir. 2009).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 860.
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so long as there is ‘a fairly traceable connection between the alleged
injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant.’”183 In
concluding that the plaintiffs had satisfied the traceability requirement,
the court analogized the Comer scenario to Massachusetts v. EPA, in
which the Supreme Court determined that the causation element had
been met.184 Like in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Fifth Circuit held that it
did not matter if the defendants were merely a few of many sources to
cause harm to the plaintiffs.185 To satisfy the “fairly traceable” element
of standing, the court concluded that the relevant test is whether “the
pollutant causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the
plaintiffs.”186
The defendants relied on causation cases under the Clean Water Act
(CWA)187 and argued that the holdings of these cases should not be
extended to the global warming context. In rejecting the defendants’
arguments, the court provided important additional support for its
conclusion that the fairly traceable standard is not limited to CWA cases:
Defendants try to distinguish the above precedents on the
ground that they are unique Clean Water Act (“CWA”) cases.
Contrary to defendants’ argument or suggestion, the Clean
Water Act could not and did not lower the constitutional
minimum standing requirements and make CWA cases
inapposite here. The CWA’s “grant of standing reaches the outer
limits of Article III . . . Thus, if a Clean Water Act plaintiff
meets the constitutional requirements for standing, then he ipso
facto satisfies the statutory threshold as well.”188
In its political question doctrine analysis, the Fifth Circuit made an
important observation as to why public nuisance claims for climate
change impacts must be considered justiciable, at least for the immediate
183. Id. at 864 (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir.
2009)).
184. Id. at 865 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520–24 (2007)). The court
distinguished other cases upon which the defendants relied, stating that those cases depended on
independent superseding actions by parties not before the court, or they involved speculation about
what the effects of the defendants’ action would be, or what actions other parties would take in the
future. Id. at 865 n.5 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520).
185. Id. at 865.
186. Id. at 866 (quoting Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 1996)).
187. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006).
188. Comer, 585 F.3d at 867 n.6 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling
Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 161 (4th Cir. 2000)). The court further reasoned that Congress cannot lower
constitutional minimum standing requirements; therefore, standing jurisprudence under the CWA is
fully applicable to this case. Id. Moreover, the court noted that the standing jurisprudence from the
CWA cases has been applied to other contexts. Id.
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future. The court noted that until the federal government responds to the
climate change issue with legislation or regulations, “the Mississippi
common law tort rules questions posed by the present case are
justiciable, not political, because there is no commitment of those issues
exclusively to the political branches of the federal government by the
Constitution itself or by federal statutes or regulations.”189 Moreover, the
court noted that even if Congress does enact a comprehensive federal
law concerning greenhouse gas emissions, it might very well preserve
state common law remedies, as the CWA did.190
Two additional factors were critical to the court’s political question
doctrine analysis. First, the case involved a private suit against private
parties, not a suit arguing about the government’s action or inaction, and
as such was less likely to be considered a nonjusticiable political
question.191 Second, the plaintiffs were merely seeking damages, not an
injunction. The court reasoned that actions for damages are more
judicially manageable and are “considerably less likely to present
nonjusticiable political questions.”192 The court relied on Fifth Circuit
precedent to support this proposition, which concluded that “[m]onetary
damages . . . do not . . . constitute a form of relief that is not judicially
manageable.”193
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the Second
Circuit’s recent decision in American Electric Power. It noted that the
Second Circuit’s reasoning was fully consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s
approach in Comer, particularly with respect to the Second Circuit’s
“careful analysis of whether the case requires the court to address any
specific issue that is constitutionally committed to another branch of
government.”194 The court further noted that the defendants’ reliance on
the district courts’ decisions in California v. General Motors Corp. and
American Electric Power was improper, and that those decisions are
“legally flawed” and “clearly distinguishable” from the present case.195
The Fifth Circuit relied on two justifications for distinguishing these
cases that are particularly relevant to the analysis in this Article. First,
the court noted that the General Motors court “failed to explain how the
‘national and international policy issues’ implicated by global warming,
189. Id. at 870.
190. Id. at 878. The CWA’s savings clause appears at 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2006).
191. Comer, 585 F.3d at 873.
192. Id. at 874.
193. Id. (citing Gordon v. Texas, 153 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1998)).
194. Id. at 876 n.15.
195. Id. at 876.
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or the impossibility of attributing pollution to specific external sources in
the global warming context, would render the political question doctrine
applicable.”196 Second, the court emphasized that “[a]lthough the
worldwide effects of greenhouse gas emissions may . . . . make it
difficult for the plaintiffs to show proximate causation, it does not follow
that the issue has been committed exclusively to the political branches
for decision.”197
III. KIVALINA V. EXXONMOBIL CORP. AS A MODEL FOR
CLIMATE JUSTICE RELIEF
The Kivalina litigation198 reflects the refinement in litigation strategy
that has evolved from the public nuisance cases for climate change
impacts that preceded it. In Kivalina, the plaintiffs, the Native Village of
Kivalina and the City of Kivalina, Alaska, filed a public nuisance suit
against several oil, energy, and utility companies for allegedly
contributing to the effects of global warming from their excessive
emissions of greenhouse gases.199 The plaintiffs claimed that the
defendants’ emissions exacerbated sea level rise, contributing to
increased coastal erosion that destroyed part of their village and
requiring relocation of Kivalina’s residents.200 The Northern District of
California granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because the federal common law claim for public
nuisance is barred by the political question doctrine, and the plaintiffs
lacked standing.201
This Part discusses the promise and potential pitfalls of the Kivalina
litigation. It first reviews the Northern District of California’s decision
addressing standing and the political question doctrine. It then analyzes
the two most significant challenges facing the plaintiffs in Kivalina and
similarly situated future plaintiffs seeking to recover for climate change
impacts in public nuisance cases: (1) the political question doctrine and
(2) standing.

196. Id. at 877 n.18 (quoting California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL
2726871, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007)).
197. Id.
198. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). On
November 5, 2009, the plaintiffs in Kivalina filed their notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. See Koons, supra note 129.
199. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868.
200. Id. at 869.
201. Id. at 868.
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The Kivalina Litigation

The threshold question in Kivalina was whether the court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ federal claim for common law
nuisance.202 Like the plaintiffs in Comer, the plaintiffs in Kivalina
sought damages, not injunctive relief.203 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in
Comer, however, the Kivalina court concluded that the federal common
law nuisance claim would force it to resolve a matter on which it lacked
guidance to issue a reasoned conclusion.204
The Northern District of California rejected the Second Circuit’s
conclusion in American Electric Power that the common law provides
judicially manageable standards to address the plaintiffs’ claims.205 It
noted that the Second Circuit had relied on cases involving
environmental injuries that are distinguishable from the injury at issue in
Kivalina.206 The Kivalina court reasoned that “[w]hile a water pollution
claim typically involves a discrete, geographically definable waterway,
Plaintiffs’ global warming claim is based on the emission of greenhouse
gases from innumerable sources located throughout the world and
affecting the entire planet and its atmosphere.”207
The Northern District of California then addressed standing, focusing
on the “fairly traceable” standard for the causation element.208 The
plaintiffs attempted to establish standing by alleging that the defendants
had “contributed” to their injuries.209 The court determined that the
“contribution” standard for traceability, which the Fifth Circuit applied
in Comer, is limited to CWA actions.210 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in
Comer, the court relied heavily on the geographic nexus requirement
when viewing the substantial likelihood that defendants’ caused the
alleged injury. “[T]o be ‘fairly traceable,’ the plaintiff must lie in the
‘discharge zone of a polluter’ and not ‘so far downstream that their
injuries cannot be fairly traced to that defendant.’”211

202. Id. at 870.
203. Id. at 869.
204. Id. at 871.
205. Id. at 875.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 875.
208. Id. at 877 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997)).
209. Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4th
Cir. 2000); P.I.R.G. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990)).
210. Id. at 881.
211. Id. at 879 (quoting Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 162).
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In addition to finding that plaintiffs had failed the “zone of discharge”
standard for traceability, the court also concluded that they had failed to
meet the “seed of injury” requirement for traceability. It stated that
“[e]ven if the contribution theory were applicable outside the context of
a statutory water pollution claim, it is simply inapposite where, as here,
Plaintiffs have not alleged that the ‘seed’ of their injury can be traced to
any of the Defendants.”212 The plaintiffs conceded that the harm they
alleged is a product of centuries of greenhouse gas emissions from “a
multitude of sources other than the Defendants.”213 The court concluded
that this attenuated chain of events failed the seed of the injury
requirement.214
The plaintiffs further argued that they were entitled to relaxed
“special solicitude”215 standing requirements derived from
Massachusetts v. EPA.216 The court concluded that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to such special standing because, unlike the state plaintiff in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the plaintiffs here were seeking damages against
a variety of private interests, not asserting procedural rights concerning
an agency’s rulemaking authority.217
Consequently, the Northern District of California granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because the federal common law claim for public nuisance is barred by
the political question doctrine, and because the plaintiffs lacked
standing.218 Nevertheless, the Kivalina litigation is far from over. The
district court’s decision has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit and will
be subject to reexamination in light of the plaintiff-friendly outcomes
from the Second Circuit in American Electric Power and the Fifth
Circuit in Comer.

212. Id. at 880.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 882. The court meant to say “special solicitude,” but it misspelled the term. The term
“special solicitude” in the majority’s opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 & n.17
(2007), is derived from the landmark case, Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). It
refers to a state’s special ability to sue on behalf of its citizens to protect the natural resources and
environmental health and safety of its citizens within its borders. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–
20.
216. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 883.
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Obstacles to Success After Kivalina and Their Solutions

The Kivalina litigation’s legacy will endure in many forms for many
years to come. The basic premise of the claim is that vulnerable
communities should have a judicial remedy when they are forced to bear
the brunt of the burden for climate change impacts that give them no
choice but to become environmental refugees. Public nuisance and,
perhaps, other common law theories provide a potentially viable avenue
of recourse for damages to help defray the costs of these tragedies.
Though viable in theory, public nuisance claims for climate change
impacts face significant hurdles on the path to becoming
institutionalized as part of a domestic or international legal framework.
This Section argues that the political question doctrine and standing are
the most significant of these potential obstacles, and that these obstacles
impose appropriate limits on the reach of Kivalina-like plaintiffs in
future public nuisance litigation.219
1.

Multiple Recent Cases Demonstrate that Climate Justice Plaintiffs
Can Overcome the Obstacle of the Political Question Doctrine

A public nuisance suit for climate change impacts like the one at issue
in Kivalina would likely not be barred by the political question doctrine
for two basic reasons. First, compensating victims of climate change is
not textually committed to another branch; and second, assessing
damages for such impacts fits within the realm of judicial competence
and courts have “judicially discoverable and manageable standards”220 at
their disposal to address such claims.
In addition to the Second Circuit’s decision in American Electric
Power and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Comer, two other cases
arguably open the door for the theory of the case in Kivalina to pass
muster under the political question doctrine. These cases, Barasich v.
Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.221 and In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (MTBE) Products Liability Litigation,222 distinguished the political
219. All of the public nuisance claims for climate change impacts to date have been filed in
federal court. To be viable, these interstate pollution claims are filed under the federal common law
of interstate pollution, which serves as the basis for federal court jurisdiction in these cases. Relief
for public nuisance claims may also be viable under state law under the savings clause of the CAA’s
citizen suit provision, but these suits also must be filed in federal court. See supra note 190 and
accompanying text.
220. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
221. 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. La. 2006).
222. 438 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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question doctrine reasoning of the district court in American Electric
Power.
In Barasich, residents of southern Louisiana filed suit against oil- and
gas-producing companies alleging that the companies had damaged the
barrier marshlands, which in turn contributed to increased flooding and
damage during Hurricane Katrina.223 The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants’ dredging activities interrupted the hydrology of the
marshlands leading to destruction of plant life, destabilization of the soil,
and eventual erosion, until the marshlands became open water.224 In
addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants did not maintain their
canals, which resulted in further damage to the marshlands.225
The Eastern District of Louisiana did not find the issue to be a
nonjusticiable political question.226 Applying the six-factor test from
Baker v. Carr,227 the court held that the first factor was not met because
“the defendants do not contend, and the Court does not find, that there is
a textually demonstrable commitment of coastal erosion questions to a
coordinate political department.”228 The second factor was not met
because the court followed Fifth Circuit precedent in Gordon v. Texas,229
which held that “coastal erosion is not an area in which courts are unable
to determine judicially manageable standards.”230 The court in Gordon
also made the important distinction that suits for monetary damages
generally do not invoke the political question doctrine, but suits for
injunctive relief do.231 The plaintiffs in the Barasich case only sought
223. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 678.
224. Id. at 679.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 688.
227. For a discussion of the Baker v. Carr test, see supra Part II.B.1.
228. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 682. The court recognized that this factor has typically been
applied to issues involving impeachment and foreign relations. Id. at 681–82; see also Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1993) (finding a suit by a federal judge challenging his
impeachment nonjusticiable because there is a constitutional commitment of impeachment
procedures to the legislative branch); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004–05 (1979) (finding a
suit by members of Congress challenging the President’s power to determine how to terminate a
treaty with Taiwan nonjusticiable because it touched upon foreign relations, which is textually
committed to the political branches).
229. 153 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1998).
230. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
231. Id. at 685 (citing Gordon, 153 F.3d at 195). The court in Gordon noted that “[i]ndeed, as
compared to injunctive relief, requests for monetary damages are less likely to raise political
questions. Monetary damages might but typically do not require courts to dictate policy to federal
agencies, nor do they constitute a form of relief that is not judicially manageable.” Gordon, 153
F.3d at 195. On the other hand, “requests for injunctive relief can be particularly susceptible to
justiciability problems, for they have the potential to force one branch of government—the
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monetary damages, not injunctive relief.232 In addition, the Supreme
Court has never applied the second factor of Baker v. Carr to private
party disputes, such as the present case.233 The third factor was not met
because it only applies where there are no judicially manageable
standards, but those existed here.234
The Barasich court distinguished the case before it from American
Electric Power. First, the plaintiffs in Barasich sought damages and not
an injunction, as had been the case in American Electric Power.235 The
court noted that damages are typically judicially manageable remedies
and that the remedy sought in this case was restoration damages.236
Furthermore, the court recognized that the nature of the injunction
sought in American Electric Power, requiring the court to determine
appropriate emission reduction rates, was essentially legislative, which
was not at issue in this case.237 Barasich also involved a tort negligence
claim, which American Electric Power did not, and the court recognized
that this claim helped distinguish the results of American Electric
Power. 238 Given the judicially manageable standards of a tort case for an
issue that fits within the basic parameters of a traditional tort case, the
court concluded that this case was not precluded as a political question
under the second Baker factor.239 The court, however, held that the case
should be dismissed due to plaintiffs’ failure to prove adequate
judiciary—to intrude into the decisionmaking properly the domain of another branch—the
executive.” Id. at 194.
232. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
233. Id. at 684.
234. Id. at 686–87. The court further reasoned that this case is distinguishable because private
parties employing ordinary tort litigation are not requiring the court to use any standards it has not
already used to manage tort cases. It quoted the Second Circuit, which stated, “[B]ecause the
common law of tort provides clear and well-settled rules on which the district court can easily rely,
this case does not require the court to render a decision in the absence of ‘judicially discoverable
and manageable standards.’” Id. at 685 (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44,
49 (2d Cir. 1991)).
235. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
236. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
237. Id. at 686.
238. Id. at 685.
239. Id. The court reviewed the last three factors of the Baker test as one inquiry. It held that
these factors did not apply to the present case for two reasons. First, the issues in this case have not
yet been reviewed by the other branches, so the court would not be disrespecting other branches by
reviewing a decision they have already addressed. Id. at 687. Second, although the court recognized
that the government and Congress have taken some actions in response to erosion issues, it held that
judicial resolution of this issue would not conflict with federal actions because the plaintiffs are
disputing the defendant’s actions, not the permit process itself. Id. at 688.
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redressability and causation, not because it involved a political question,
as in American Electric Power.240
Another significant case to distinguish the district court’s reasoning in
American Electric Power is the MTBE products liability litigation.241 In
that case, several water companies sued numerous gasoline producers
that were alleged to have used gasoline products containing methyl
tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) that contaminated groundwater.242 The
complaint included public nuisance and other tort-related claims,
alleging that the defendants’ products contaminated groundwater.243 The
defendants moved to dismiss these claims as nonjusticiable political
questions under the Baker test, emphasizing the two factors involving
initial policy determinations (third factor) and lack of respect for another
already interested branch (fourth factor).244 The court held that the
plaintiffs’ claims were not precluded by the political question
doctrine.245
Given that the Supreme Court had not recently ruled on the third and
fourth factors of the Baker test, the MTBE court considered relevant
circuit court precedent246 and distinguished American Electric Power.
Regarding the third factor, the court disagreed with the defendants’
claim that to balance “relevant economic, environmental, energy and
security interests implicated by plaintiffs’ effort to ban MTBE” would
require the court to engage in an initial policy determination that should
be left to the political branches.247 The court noted the difference
between determining liability and determining policy.248 Because
Congress had not addressed the issue by banning such additives or
limiting the liability of producers, the court only needed to address
240. Id. at 695.
241. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d 291
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
242. Id. at 293.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 299.
245. Id. at 304. The fact that the court addressed the issues under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
distinguishes the case because the 12(b)(6) standard of review is more plaintiff-friendly. The court
must proceed with the presumption that all factual allegations made are true, assume all inferences
in the plaintiff’s favor, and the plaintiff need only show that the complaint is legally feasible,
without having to demonstrate any burden of proof regarding the weight of evidence. Id. at 295. To
warrant dismissal, the court must find the claim is clearly and “inextricably linked” to a political
question and must distinguish mere political cases from political questions. Id. If this link is too
attenuated, the court will avoid finding political questions. Id.
246. See id. at 297–305.
247. Id. at 300.
248. Id.

AbateDTPed.doc (Do Not Delete)

230

5/17/2010 9:37 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:197

whether the defendants were liable for the harm their products caused.249
At the time of suit, Congress had not preempted or comprehensively
regulated this use; therefore, the court determined that allowing tort
claims would not interfere with a federal agenda.250 The court further
noted that, even if the use of these additives was federally regulated or
could foreseeably be banned by Congress in the future, tort claim
liability is not precluded “absent a congressional injunction prohibiting
such suits.”251 The court held that congressional “regulation is relevant
to tort liability,” but it is not dispositive on the issue.252
The MTBE court also recognized the relevance of the scope and
nature of the remedy sought.253 In American Electric Power, the
plaintiffs sought an injunction to cap emissions and for the court to
determine a specific percentage of annual emissions reduction.254 The
court in American Electric Power reasoned that such a remedy would
force the court to make initial policy determinations regarding the
percentage of emissions reductions, a policy determination more
appropriately left to Congress.255 In MTBE, however, the plaintiffs
merely sought to prevent the defendants from “engaging in further
releases of MTBE,” contending that such public nuisance common law
tort claims, which provided the court with adequate guidelines, were
historically within the judiciary’s domain.256
The MTBE court concluded that the plaintiffs’ tort claims, including
the public nuisance claim, were not precluded by the political question
doctrine.257 The court recognized that the issues arose within a political
context, but absent any contradictory actions or statements from the
legislature or executive branches, the case did not present a political
question under the two Baker factors that defendants pled.258 The court
denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss.259

249. Id.
250. Id. at 301.
251. Id. at 300.
252. Id. at 301.
253. Id.
254. Id. (citing Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009)).
255. Id. (citing Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 274).
256. Id. at 301 (emphasis omitted).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 303–04.
259. Id. at 294–95, 304.
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Therefore, the decisions in Barasich and MTBE reinforce the Second
and Fifth Circuits’ political question doctrine reasoning in American
Electric Power and Comer, and confirm the viability of Kivalina-like
litigation. Public nuisance suits for climate change impacts like Kivalina
would likely not be barred by the political question doctrine because
compensating victims of climate change is not textually committed to
another branch and because courts have judicially manageable standards
at their disposal to address such damage claims.
2.

Climate Justice Plaintiffs Who Establish Geographical Nexus Can
Overcome the Obstacle Posed by the Standing Doctrine

In Kivalina-like public nuisance litigation, standing is another
potential obstacle. When considering standing analysis in this context,
an important issue is whether geographical nexus is necessary to
establish standing to recover for alleged global environmental injury.260
Geographical nexus refers to “the connection required to give an
individual or government a legitimate interest in an environmental
problem in a given locale.”261
Several courts have determined that the geographical nexus
requirement was satisfied and standing established in cases involving
challenges under various environmental law statutes. In City of Davis v.
Coleman,262 one of the first cases to address the geographical nexus
requirement, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a procedural injury from
an agency’s failure to comply with requirements under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)263 provided sufficient injury for
standing purposes, as long as the plaintiff had a “geographical nexus” to
the disputed conduct such that the continuation of such conduct may
cause foreseeable harm to the plaintiff.264
In Coleman, the city alleged that a proposed highway interchange that
would make a planned industrial development possible may adversely
affect the quality and quantity of the city water supply. It further asserted
260. See generally Blake R. Bertagna, “Standing” Up for the Environment: The Ability of
Plaintiffs to Establish Legal Standing to Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 BYU L.
REV. 415 (arguing that plaintiffs seeking redress for defendants’ contributions to global climate
change should allege procedural, rather than substantive, injury claims to overcome geographical
nexus concerns).
261. Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographic Nexus in Environmental Law, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (1996).
262. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
263. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006).
264. Coleman, 521 F.2d. at 671.
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that the development would cause an influx of population that would
frustrate the city’s policy of “controlled growth” and render its planning
efforts obsolete.265 The court stated that in creating the environmental
impact statement (EIS) requirement, “Congress intended to create
procedural rights in people who have a sufficient geographical nexus to
the site of the challenged project that they could be expected to suffer
whatever environmental consequences the project may have.”266 The
court further determined that “[t]he procedural injury implicit in agency
failure to prepare an EIS . . . is itself a sufficient ‘injury in fact’ to
support standing.”267 The court concluded that the City of Davis met the
test in this case because the Federal Highway Administration’s project
was located between three and four miles south of the city,268 and,
because of this proximity, the city could be expected to suffer a wide
variety of environmental consequences that it alleged would result from
the interchange.269
In two subsequent procedural injury cases, the scope of viable
geographical nexus claims enlarged considerably. In Committee to Save
the Rio Hondo v. Lucero,270 the plaintiffs alleged that their use and
enjoyment of areas surrounding a ski resort would be harmed by the
defendant’s failure to comply with NEPA when carrying out a proposed
expansion of the ski resort for use in summer months.271 The Tenth
Circuit confirmed that to establish injury in fact, the plaintiff must claim
a geographical nexus with the area of alleged harm or an actual use of
the area where the alleged harm occurs.272 Here, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs, who resided twelve to fifteen miles down the river from
the ski resort, satisfied the geographical nexus requirement.273 The
plaintiffs maintained that they had used the waters of the Rio Hondo
watershed throughout their lifetimes for irrigating, fishing, and
swimming, and that they intended to continue such use.274 The court
reasoned that the plaintiffs had a sufficient connection to the area
because the use of the ski resort caused an increased risk of harm to the
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 665.
269. Id. at 671.
270. 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996).
271. Id. at 447.
272. Id. at 449.
273. Id. at 450.
274. Id.
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plaintiffs from the river, which flows downstream from the resort to the
plaintiffs’ land.275
The Ninth Circuit similarly concluded that the geographical nexus
requirement was satisfied in Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA,276
which involved a procedural injury claim under NEPA and the
Endangered Species Act (ESA).277 The plaintiffs alleged they were
injured by harms to several natural parks throughout the country, which
the plaintiffs’ members used to observe nature and wildlife.278 The
plaintiffs asserted that their interests were impaired by the USDA’s and
U.S. Forest Service’s failure to comply with procedural requirements of
NEPA and the ESA before promulgating a new national forest
management policy.279 Although the USDA had prepared an
Environmental Assessment (EA) and a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI), the citizens were deprived of the opportunity to comment.280
In addition, the USDA failed to complete a biological assessment under
the ESA and did not engage in formal consultation with the Secretary of
the Interior.281 The court held that the plaintiffs had established an injury
because they used the particular parks of interest, which established the
geographical nexus to the alleged harm.282 Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs need only allege a geographical
nexus with an area that is subject to an increased risk of harm from the
defendants’ conduct and need not specify exactly what harm would
occur within any given national park.283
Geographical nexus has also been established in standing cases in
which substantive injuries were alleged. For example, in Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw,284 the plaintiffs lived in the vicinity of the defendant’s
facility, which discharged various pollutants into a river in violation of
the CWA.285 The plaintiffs’ members who had expressed concerns in
275. Id. The court distinguished this case from Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S.
871 (1990), in that here, the plaintiffs’ land downstream was specified, whereas in National Wildlife
Federation, the geographical nexus was not established by simply alleging that the plaintiffs had an
interest somewhere within the vicinity of harm that occurred on a large tract of land. See id. at 451.
276. 341 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2003).
277. Id. at 965. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006).
278. Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 972.
279. Id. at 970.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 967.
282. Id. at 971.
283. Id. at 971–72.
284. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
285. Id. at 181–83.
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affidavits lived one-quarter mile, one-half mile, two miles, twenty miles,
and forty miles from the defendant’s facility.286 The Supreme Court
concluded that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged injury in fact by
asserting that they used the affected area and are persons “for whom the
aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened” by the
challenged activity.287
Similarly, in Covington v. Jefferson County,288 the plaintiffs lived
across the street from a city landfill and suffered impacts both
individually and to their property from the landfill’s unsanitary
operations.289 The plaintiffs faced several risks from the landfill’s
operation including fires, explosions, vectors, scavengers, and
groundwater contamination.290 The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
were directly affected by, or at a greatly increased risk, of such impacts
due to their close proximity, which established a concrete risk of harm
and sufficient injury in fact.291 The court noted that a plaintiff need not
prove damage has happened or will definitely happen, as long as there is
an increased probability that the threatened harm will occur.292
Therefore, to meet the injury-in-fact requirement for standing in their
citizen suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA)293 and the CAA,294 the plaintiffs were not required to show that
they would prevail on their challenge asserting that the landfill’s
operation violated these statutes, but only needed to show that the
conduct they challenged sufficiently injured them.295 In Covington, the
court concluded that the plaintiffs adequately alleged injury-in-fact when
they averred that they used the affected area, and that they are persons
for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area would be
lessened by the challenged activity.296
286. Id.
287. Id. at 183 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)). But see Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 1996) (requiring plaintiff to
demonstrate a more specific geographic or causative nexus because an eighteen-mile distance
between the point of discharge and the area of plaintiff’s use of a waterway was deemed “too large
to infer causation”).
288. 358 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2004).
289. Id. at 638.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See id.
293. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006).
294. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006).
295. Covington, 358 F.3d at 639.
296. Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000)).

AbateDTPed.doc (Do Not Delete)

2010]

PUBLIC NUISANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE

5/17/2010 9:37 AM

235

Geographical nexus analysis for global environmental harms with
local impacts is the analysis most relevant for purposes of evaluating
Kivalina-like litigation. The courts’ review of geographical nexus in
global environmental harm cases also draws on causation concerns. In
another challenge under the CAA, the plaintiffs in Northwest
Environmental Defense Center v. Owens Corning Corp.297 alleged that
the defendant company was violating the CAA by emitting harmful
ozone-depleting gases without a permit for its facility.298 The plaintiffs,
who resided, worked, and recreated near the partially completed facility,
feared future harm to their health and environment.299 The plaintiffs
alleged that they would suffer direct health impacts from emissions
entering into the atmosphere from the defendant’s facility, and that the
local ecosystem with which these individuals constantly interact could
be damaged.300
The court in Owens Corning Corp. concluded that the plaintiffs had
standing to bring the suit.301 While recognizing that global warming is a
general problem for the entire world, the court determined that the
injuries that the plaintiffs alleged concerned their locality and had
already manifested themselves in their vicinity.302 The court further
noted that the complaint need only establish an individualized injury to
the plaintiffs.303 The plaintiffs did not need to prove with scientific
certainty that the defendant’s emissions, and only those emissions, were
the cause of their apprehensions.304
Courts have determined that plaintiffs lacked sufficient geographical
nexus to support standing in several cases; however, these courts so
concluded on factually distinguishable grounds. The first two of these
cases illustrate the proposition that “bad facts make bad law,” and are
easily distinguishable from Kivalina-like litigation scenarios. The
297. 434 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. Or. 2006).
298. Id. at 959–60.
299. Id. at 960–61.
300. Id. at 965.
301. Id. at 971.
302. Id. at 970.
303. Id. at 967.
304. Id. Regarding prudential concerns, the defendant argued that the zone of interest would be
too large because worldwide emissions cannot be monitored, and a worldwide zone of interest is
unreasonable. Id. at 969. The court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims asserted their own rights
and that the zone of interest concern was satisfied. Id. Moreover, in response to the defendant’s
position that the plaintiffs’ allegations constituted a generalized grievance, the court concluded that
just because an injury is widespread does not mean it is generalized or beyond the court’s authority.
Id.
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combination of Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation305 and Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife306 heralded the onset of a new and more restrictive
era in environmental standing. The plaintiffs in National Wildlife
Federation alleged that their use and enjoyment of land in a general
vicinity of large tracts of lands was harmed.307 The Supreme Court
concluded that this general proximity was not specific enough to
establish standing.308
One of the areas alleged as a vicinity of interest, known as the
“Arizona Strip,” was 5.5 million acres.309 As such, the plaintiffs’
proximity to the harm was not established.310 The Supreme Court
explained that such general conclusions do not meet the geographical
requirements to survive a motion for summary judgment.311 The Court
reasoned that “Rule 56(e) is assuredly not satisfied by averments which
state only that one of respondent’s members uses unspecified portions of
an immense tract of territory, on some portions of which mining activity
has occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the governmental
action.”312 According to the Court, allegations that “presume” missing
facts are insufficient because, without them, the affidavits would not
establish the alleged injury.313 Unlike the speculative allegations in
National Wildlife Federation, the plaintiffs in Kivalina have alleged
concrete harm—coastal erosion—that is linked to the defendants’

305. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
306. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
307. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 887.
308. Id. at 889.
309. Id. at 887.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 889.
312. Id.
313. Id. The Court distinguished its standard of review from the one at issue in United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), noting that the
standard in SCRAP differed because it involved a motion to dismiss and not a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 889. Subsequently, in United States
v. AVX Corp., the First Circuit further qualified the relevance of SCRAP. 962 F.2d 108, 117 (1st Cir.
1992). The court stated that “it is not enough, at least in the post-Lujan era, that a plaintiff possesses
some generalized, undifferentiated interest in preserving those resources.” Id. at 118. Rather, as
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has concluded, a plaintiff, to secure standing, “must show that he or
she uses the specific property in question.” Id. (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 2.3.2 (Little, Brown & Co. Supp. 1990)). The AVX court interpreted the
geographical nexus requirement strictly by suggesting that living within a state is not enough; the
plaintiffs’ proximity to the alleged harm must be more localized. Id. at 117. In SCRAP, on the other
hand, the plaintiffs lived in and used land within a 5564 square-mile area that encompassed
Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia. Id.
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contributions to climate change as manifested by sea level rise, which is
one of the principal impacts of climate change.
A similarly defective brand of non-specific allegations on an even
larger environmental scale was at issue in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.
This case involved an ESA claim regarding actions taken abroad that the
plaintiffs claimed affected their ability to enjoy endangered species of
wildlife that they had observed in foreign countries.314 The Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not show
a particularized and individual injury.315 The Court noted that to assert
an individual injury, the plaintiff must show more than just a general
injury to the ecosystem based on conduct far away from the plaintiffs’
location.316 An injury is not concrete and particularized enough if it is
merely a general injury that may affect anyone anywhere on the globe
who has an interest in observing and studying wildlife.317 Furthermore, a
special interest in the action is not sufficient to allege injury; the
plaintiffs’ injury must still be direct.318 The Court also held that “some
day” intentions to return to the sites where the plaintiffs had observed
the endangered species in question were not sufficient to satisfy the
actual or imminent requirement for injury.319 The Court conceded,
however, that failing to prove a geographical proximity to the harm,
based on distance alone, would not necessarily defeat an injury claim.320
The D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion on similar non-specific
allegations in Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen.321 In that case, the
plaintiffs opposed a tax change on the gas additive ETBE, claiming that
the new tax would increase the production of ethanol in their vicinities,
leading to an increase in agriculture, which in turn would harm the
environment of the plaintiffs’ agricultural areas.322 The plaintiffs alleged
314. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562–63.
315. Id. at 563.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 564. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ additional attempts to show individualized
injury. The Court found the first attempt, the “ecosystem nexus,” insufficient because the plaintiff
must prove they actually use the area affected and not simply an area “roughly in the vicinity of” it.
Id. at 565–66. The plaintiffs’ second attempt, the “animal nexus,” was also found insufficient
because it would give standing to anyone anywhere in the world who wanted to claim injury. Id. at
566–67. The last attempt, the “vocational nexus,” was also held insufficient because it would give
the same general right to sue to everyone with a professional interest, regardless of individualized
factors. Id.
320. Id. at 567 n.3.
321. 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
322. Id. at 666.
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that this increase in agriculture would affect wildlife in the areas that
bordered the agricultural developments.323 The D.C. Circuit denied
standing for this claim, stating that there was insufficient evidence that
the tax would harm the particular agricultural areas and that, if anything,
the plaintiffs merely alleged a hypothetical harm that was common to all
and not specific to the area at issue.324 Consequently, the court
concluded that plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient geographical nexus
for the alleged harm.325
The only case involving geographical nexus that could undermine
plaintiffs’ ability to establish geographical nexus in Kivalina-like
litigation is a 2009 case from the D.C. Circuit, Center for Biological
Diversity v. U.S. Department of the Interior.326 The Center for Biological
Diversity challenged the Department of the Interior’s (DOI’s) approval
of a new five-year oil and gas leasing program, which included an
expansion of previous lease offerings in the Beaufort, Bering, and
Chukchi Seas off the coast of Alaska.327 Among several claims, the
plaintiff argued that DOI violated both the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act and NEPA for failing to take into consideration both the
effects of climate change on outer continental shelf areas and the leasing
program’s effects on climate change.328 The court distinguished the
substantive standing claim in this case from the claim at issue in
Massachusetts v. EPA.329 The court noted that in Massachusetts v. EPA,
the state was allowed to sue as a sovereign on behalf of its individually
affected citizens for the impacts of loss of coastal land from sea level
rise.330 In this case, however, the D.C. Circuit noted that the claim
alleged climate change impacts in general without any direct and
personal injury to the citizens of the Village of Point Hope, Alaska.331
323. Id. at 667.
324. Id. at 668. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that individual corn
or sugar farmers in these areas would affirmatively respond to the tax credit by significantly
increasing production. Id. at 667. Instead, the plaintiffs contended that the tax credit would create a
general risk of serious environmental harm by encouraging farmers throughout the United States,
and by implication, farmers near the wildlife areas that the plaintiffs visited, to increase production
in a manner that would increase agricultural pollution, which in turn would damage the wildlife
areas. Id.
325. Id. at 668.
326. 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
327. Id. at 471.
328. Id. at 471–72.
329. Id. at 476 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–23).
330. Id. at 476–77.
331. Id. at 477. The Village of Point Hope, Alaska is a federally recognized tribal government
whose members use the Chukchi Sea for hunting, fishing, whaling, and gathering.
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Furthermore, even if the harm were not a general claim, the only climate
change impacts that were occurring affected property owned by the
federal government and not Point Hope’s sovereign property.332 Thus,
even though the tribe’s members use the affected area, the court denied
Point Hope the opportunity to assert the “special solicitude” exception
established in Massachusetts v. EPA.333 Thus, the substantive injury
claim in this case failed for lack of standing because the allegations were
not individualized and particular, but general to humanity at large. It also
failed because the court regarded the claim as hypothetical and lacking
causation.334
While the court in Center for Biological Diversity arguably reached
the correct conclusion on the facts before it, the scenario in that case is
distinguishable from Kivalina-like litigation for climate change impacts.
The Fifth Circuit in Comer addressed this distinction directly and
effectively:
[T]he D.C. Circuit [in Center for Biological Diversity] found
that the plaintiffs could only speculate that the damages will
occur only if many different actors . . . all acted in a way that
would increase global warming to cause damage. Here, the
plaintiffs, instead, make allegations, taken as true, that a past
causation link led to their particularized damage—therefore, the
alleged harms to the plaintiffs’ specific property and persons are
“traceable” to the Defendants without speculation as to the
Defendants’ and third parties’ future actions and interactions.335
In a related vein, the Fifth Circuit in Comer also determined that the
chain of causation at issue in Comer was “one step shorter than the one
recognized in Massachusetts”; therefore, the plaintiffs in Comer did not
need to rely on the special solicitude exception to establish standing.336
These standing cases demonstrate that public nuisance claims for
climate change impacts face a challenging but not insurmountable
obstacle in seeking to comply with the geographical nexus and causation
requirements for standing. Based on the Owens Corning Corp. and
Center for Biological Diversity cases discussed above, parties alleging
claims that are closely analogous to the Kivalina scenario are likely to
meet standing requirements because of the direct cause and effect
relationship at issue. Scenarios like Comer have the potential to be
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 478.
335. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 863 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
336. Id. at 865 n.5.
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successful, but will prove more challenging to fulfill the geographical
nexus and causation requirements. One impact of climate change is a
mere increased likelihood of a severe storm event such as Hurricane
Katrina, which in turn caused the devastating impacts that the plaintiffs
suffered in Comer. By contrast, the increased coastal erosion in
Kivalina, caused at least in part by climate change, directly caused the
need to evacuate the village.
IV. PUBLIC NUISANCE LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
AS A SHORT- AND LONG-TERM SOLUTION FOR THE
GLOBAL CLIMATE JUSTICE MOVEMENT
This Part evaluates the lessons learned from public nuisance suits for
climate change impacts and how such lessons can be adapted for use on
the international stage. It first examines the opportunities that public
nuisance suits for climate change impacts offer as a short-term fix and a
possible foundation for a long-term solution for populations
disproportionately affected by climate change in the United States and
throughout the world. It then provides some observations about the
synergies between these suits and the evolution of citizen suits under
U.S. environmental law.
A.

Public Nuisance Suits as Viable Relief for the Present and Future

The crisis in the Native Village of Kivalina and situations like it
throughout the world demand both a short-term remedy and a long-term
solution. These desperate situations require an urgent and creative legal
response because traditional international climate change treaty
negotiations cannot develop and implement a viable remedy quickly
enough. Such responses take years, if not decades, to evolve.
In the meantime, engaging the judiciary to secure common law relief
through remedies such as public nuisance litigation may be a viable
short-term remedy in that it is the most immediate way to redress the
harm for victims in the United States. However, it is a limited and
unreliable solution on its own terms because it is confined to case-bycase assessments of whether such a remedy exists, and it must overcome
challenging jurisdictional obstacles such as the political question
doctrine337 and standing338 for such claims to be heard. The publicity
337. For a discussion of the political question doctrine challenges that climate justice plaintiffs
face, see supra Part III.B.1.
338. For a discussion of the standing doctrine challenges that climate justice plaintiffs face, see
supra Part III.B.2.
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from and potential victories in public nuisance suits can, in the long
term, help lay a foundation for a future climate justice framework. Such
an opportunity could mirror and capitalize on the evolution of citizen
suits under federal environmental laws by institutionalizing a private
right to be free from climate change impacts that threaten the
sustainability of vulnerable communities in a post-Kyoto world.
1.

Short-Term Relief

Important conditions and limitations need to be in place for future
public nuisance suits for climate change impacts to be successful. First,
Article III standing jurisprudence demands that only parties that meet
injury, causation, and redressability requirements are eligible to seek the
relief from the courts. Second, the suits must seek relief that the courts
can grant. The political question doctrine can impose appropriate limits
on the justiciability of these claims. Litigants should not ask courts to
play the role of Congress, even when Congress has not responded to
critical issues of national concern in a timely manner. For public
nuisance cases to be justiciable, there must be an allegation of individual
harm for which the court can fashion a remedy. Asking the court to
determine an emission cap for power plants throughout the nation is not
an appropriate theory of relief in a public nuisance case because such a
remedy must be established and implemented in the legislative and
executive branches through climate treaty negotiations and domestic
implementing legislation.339 Although the Second Circuit accepted this
theory of relief in American Electric Power, it is very unlikely that the
Supreme Court would embrace such a view if it grants review in the
case.
Public nuisance cases for climate change impacts also need to allege
viable causal connections between the defendants’ acts or omissions and
the alleged victims’ injuries. The allegations in Comer represent the
outer limits of a potentially viable claim on causation grounds. As the
Fifth Circuit noted, the Comer causation scenario is no more attenuated
than the causal connection that was determined to be valid in
Massachusetts v. EPA on special solicitude standing grounds.340
339. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding courts may refrain from hearing
disputes on political question grounds if there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”).
340. The Fifth Circuit in Comer held that it did not matter if the defendants were merely a few of
many sources to cause harm to the plaintiffs. 585 F.3d at 865. To satisfy the “fairly traceable”
element of standing, the court concluded that the relevant test is whether “the pollutant causes or
contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs.” Id. at 866 (quoting Sierra Club v.
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Although the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ case could proceed,
this scenario, like American Electric Power, is likely to fail if it reaches
the Supreme Court.
The best source of hope is the “just right” factual circumstances
reflected in the Kivalina scenario. While alleging proper injury in fact is
often the most significant hurdle in environmental standing cases, the
biggest potential standing hurdle in public nuisance claims for climate
change impacts is causation. Even though the “fairly traceable” standard
for causation is more plaintiff-friendly than the proximate causation
requirement in negligence claims, the fairly traceable standard
nevertheless can be a daunting hurdle in the context of global
environmental harms. The causal connection in Kivalina, albeit broad, is
tighter than what the Fifth Circuit approved in Comer. More importantly,
the theory of relief in Kivalina is the best available in this sequence of
public nuisance cases because individual victims of the impacts have
been identified.
Therefore, the American Electric Power-Comer-Kivalina trilogy
represents a “good-better-best” spectrum of refinement in public
nuisance cases for climate change impacts. The theory of relief in
American Electric Power was effective as an awareness-raising
mechanism to goad the federal government into responding to the
climate change problem with an effective federal system of regulation;
however, it was not a viable theory upon which to base future remedies
in public nuisance cases.341 The Comer case also is effective as a goad
for future government regulation of climate change impacts, but it too is
not an ideal theory of relief for future public nuisance cases because it is
potentially subject to abuse as a means to scapegoat the regulated
community by extracting piecemeal relief from those entities for a
regulatory failure that rests primarily with the federal government.342
However, the failure of the other common law claims in Comer
underscores the potential ongoing validity of the public nuisance theory
in that case. The Fifth Circuit in Comer held that the other common law
claims in the case—unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and fraudulent
misrepresentation—must be dismissed on prudential standing grounds as
nonjusticiable grievances common to all of society.343 Unlike the public
nuisance claim in Comer, these other common law claims sought relief

Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 1996)).
341. For a discussion of the American Electric Power case, see supra Part II.B.1.
342. For a discussion of the Comer case, see supra Part II.B.3.
343. Comer, 585 F.3d at 867–68.
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for the failure of the government to properly regulate the emissions.344
While those concerns are valid, they are more properly addressed by the
legislative and executive branches. In contrast, the public nuisance claim
is a strong basis for such suits because it is valid on both standing and
political question grounds.
The Kivalina litigation builds on the viability of public nuisance
theory from Comer in seeking relief for identified victims of cultural
genocide in connection with climate change impacts. The public
nuisance framework provides a useful structure for an individual,
reactive, short-term remedy. The Native Village of Kivalina exemplifies
the proper type of plaintiff for this kind of action. The nature and degree
of harm to it is such that appropriate judicial parameters on the viability
of future claims can be imposed because “cultural genocide” is a very
difficult standard to meet. Public nuisance claims can succeed where
disparate impact litigation failed in the environmental justice context.
Like environmental justice, such claims can promote positive outcomes
through enhanced awareness and proactive measures to protect such
disproportionately affected communities. Unlike environmental justice
litigation, however, climate justice litigation offers victims the
possibility of sustaining their claims in the courts and obtaining the relief
they deserve.
Although public nuisance litigation offers a viable mechanism
through which human rights impacts from climate change can be
remedied, this common law avenue of relief can be abused.345 Especially
at a time when the U.S. government has been slow to implement a
federal response to climate change, the regulated community is
especially vulnerable to public nuisance suits. Such suits run the risk of
targeting the regulated entities as “scapegoats” of an impatient public’s
desire for tangible relief in addressing the climate change problem.
Therefore, this approach is problematic over the long term and should be
replaced with a top-down response to the climate change problem that
can incorporate human rights concerns at both the domestic and
international levels.

344. Id.
345. See generally Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts:
Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a “Global Warming Solution” in California, 40
CONN. L. REV. 591, 624–29 (2008) (discussing possible abuses of public nuisance litigation in
environmental law matters); Faulk & Gray, supra note 14 (discussing lead paint litigation as an
example of abuse of public nuisance suits). It is likely that there will be a similar evolution with
respect to climate justice rights and remedies.
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Building a Long-Term Framework

Public nuisance litigation is a useful mechanism to spur
“institutionalized” relief in the form of a federal statutory or treaty-based
remedy in the near future for the victims of climate change impacts. The
evolution of citizen enforcement of federal environmental laws is
instructive in this regard. Prior to the 1970s, recovering for harm to
shared resources such as mountains, rivers, and oceans was the sole
province of the government. Concerned citizens could only urge their
elected officials to respond to these crises but were otherwise powerless
to respond directly. Common law remedies were the only legal recourse
that these concerned citizens could turn to for relief. These legal theories
were an extremely limited and largely ineffective means of seeking the
broad-based relief for environmental harms that plaintiffs sought.
Nevertheless, the creative use of common law remedies was an
important precursor to raise awareness of the need for comprehensive
federal and state statutory-based schemes to address these problems, and
the need to allow citizens to play meaningful roles in enforcing new
legislative schemes through citizen suit provisions.346
A similar recognition and evolution could occur through the creative
use of public nuisance litigation to seek recovery for climate change
impacts. The victims are clearly identifiable (i.e., the people who are
forced to move from their communities), which is similar to the way in
which the exploited resources were the clearly identified “victims” in the
1970s. This litigation would help raise awareness of the need for a
comprehensive federal response, which would ultimately help the
victims of climate change impacts. Eliminating the prudential
considerations component for standing in citizen suit provisions under
federal environmental laws has enhanced access to the courts for
aggrieved plaintiffs to recover for environmental harm, and this
progression of public nuisance suits could achieve a similar result
here.347
Like the explosion of federal environmental law in the United States
in the 1970s and 1980s, the use of public nuisance suits and other
common law remedies for climate change impacts in the United States
346. “Environmental citizen suits seemed farfetched in the early 1970s, but by the early 1980s,
they had become institutionalized.” Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise
and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 370, 399 (2006) (citing MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL
CITIZEN SUITS 1-9, 1-10 (1991)).
347. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that
Congress may eliminate the prudential requirements of standing by legislation).
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could provide valuable guidance to the international community. For
example, the Australian counterpart to the Kivalina litigation involves
the Torres Straits Islanders. Australia is the sixteenth largest and fourth
highest per capita greenhouse gas emitter.348 In addition to its current
and future climate change treaty commitments, common law litigation
will be a potentially effective means to apply the legal, political, and
moral pressure necessary to ensure the current Australian government
will do all that is possible to address the problem.349
To date, the legal means for addressing such issues in Australia have
been through judicial and merits review in administrative law.350 A tort
complaint based in negligence or nuisance could be more effective and
would be highly relevant to the circumstances of the Torres Straits;
however, asserting a tort claim against the government is difficult on
causation grounds.351 In the alternative, some countries have sought to
apply international law in global warming cases, claiming that
governments have failed to prevent transboundary harm.352
Unfortunately, the Torres Strait Islanders would face a daunting
challenge in proving standing, as the International Court of Justice is
restricted to states, and Australia’s courts cannot force a foreign
government to comply with Australia’s international obligations.353
A more realistic option for the Torres Strait Islanders would be to
make an individual complaint to the United Nations Human Rights
Commission (HRC). The HRC was established in 1947 to protect human
rights.354 It does not use judicial proceedings in human rights cases, but
instead focuses on raising public awareness and implementing programs
to address these issues in each of its member states.355 Nevertheless, a
favorable outcome at the HRC may put the necessary pressure on future
governmental policy decisions.356 Fortunately, human rights bodies such
348. See supra Part I.
349. See supra Part III.B.
350. See supra Part III.B.
351. See supra Part III.B.
352. Kalinga Seneviratne, Tiny Tuvalu Steps up Threat to Sue Australia, U.S., INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Sept. 5, 2002, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0905-02.htm.
353. Press Release, International Commission of Jurists: Australian Section, ICJ Australia
Opposes New Counter-Terrorism Laws 1 (Oct. 7, 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/country,,ICJURISTS,,AUS,,48a3f02ed,0.html.
354. Caroline Dommen, How Human Rights Norms Can Contribute to Environmental Protection:
Some Practical Possibilities Within the United Nations System, in LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 105, 106 (Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant eds., 2003).
355. Id. at 106.
356. The Inuit advanced a similar theory in their petition against the United States before the
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as the HRC have developed a link between human rights and the
environment to allow for such an inquiry, particularly for indigenous
peoples adversely affected by environmentally harmful activities.357 The
HRC has recognized rights to life, freedom of residence, and movement;
the enjoyment of culture; the protection of privacy, family, and the
home; property; and health.358 In a similar case involving the Inuit,
alleged infringement of these rights was also asserted.359
A Torres Straits complaint to the HRC would have to challenge
Australia’s compliance with its obligations under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).360 The plaintiffs could
assert that the Covenant adopted by the government to protect citizens
requires the government to adopt measures to prevent climate change.361
The complaint would have to assert that Australia’s current greenhouse
gas emission levels are not in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol and
post-Kyoto negotiations.362 A complaint in Australian national courts
would have to challenge the appropriateness of the government’s
emission reduction targets, and whether the government has adopted
adequate policies to ensure those targets will be met in a timely
manner.363 Domestic remedies must be exhausted prior to application to
the human rights body.364 However, since this type of problem exists on
an international level, this step can be accomplished easily.365
Such a complaint must also address causation issues. First, the
complaint must show that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are
responsible for global warming.366 Second, the specific impacts of
climate change alleged to violate islanders’ ICCPR rights must be
attributed to anthropogenic greenhouse gases. Third, and most difficult,
the harm to the islanders’ ICCPR rights must be attributed to the acts or
omissions of the Australian Government. Finally, standing must be
addressed. So long as an applicant is considered a “victim,” he or she
Inter-American Human Right Commission. See Emily Gertz, Inuit Fight Climate Change with
Human-Rights Claim Against U.S., GRIST, July 26, 2005, http://www.grist.org/article/gertz-inuit.
357. Id.
358. Id.; Seneviratne, supra note 352.
359. Gertz, supra note 356.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
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will have standing.367 Therefore, the complaint should allege actual
injury to the islanders.368
The Kivalina litigation addresses all of these important questions and
could provide a valuable reference point from which to spread the
viability of this theory of relief throughout the international community.
The case involves two essential elements for success: (1) identified
victims who have suffered direct harm from climate change impacts; and
(2) the degree of harm suffered constitutes cultural genocide because the
need to relocate the population fundamentally alters the subsistence
lifestyle of the community. Climate justice relief need not be limited to
such extreme factual scenarios; however, compelling cases are necessary
to establish precedent in the courts that can later be institutionalized in
legislation.
The success of a small number of these suits under these limited
circumstances could help the climate justice field grow by replicating the
evolution of citizen suits under federal environmental law. The
foundation for citizen suits under federal environmental laws was a
series of successful, albeit piecemeal and uncoordinated, lawsuits
applying creative common law theories. The recognition of the need for
meaningful public participation and enhanced governmental and private
sector environmental accountability prompted Congress to respond with
a comprehensive framework of citizen suit provisions in federal
environmental laws. Similarly, climate justice claims that once were
only viable in the courts on a piecemeal basis can become more
“institutionalized” and likely to succeed when authorized pursuant to a
federal legislative scheme. Once a federal regulatory system is in place,
however, public nuisance suits for climate change impacts should remain
available as a viable gap-filler remedy for limited and extreme scenarios
like the Kivalina plaintiffs. This approach is transferable to the
international context as part of a post-Kyoto framework as the
international community moves forward from Copenhagen.
B.

Incorporating Climate Justice Principles into the Post-Kyoto
Regime

As Kivalina-like litigation theories gain support in the courts in the
United States, Australia and elsewhere, they may prompt nations to
develop legislation recognizing such human rights-based protections for
climate change impacts. The next step would be to integrate such a
367. Id.
368. Id.
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theory at the international level in a treaty or pre-treaty agreement, such
as the recent Copenhagen Accord.369 A similar progression occurred in
the context of environmental impact assessment, which took hold in the
United States in the late 1960s370 and was subsequently integrated into
international environmental law treaties in the ensuing decades.371
Developing countries’ interests are now commanding more attention
than ever before in international climate change negotiations.372 The
need for climate justice provisions as part of a post-Kyoto regime is
likely to gain a similar stronghold with possible victories at the domestic
level in cases like Kivalina and the Torres Strait Islanders. One goal of
the climate justice movement is that the cultural genocide these
victimized populations are facing or may face in the immediate future
should begin to trigger domestic and international human rights
protections.373
Some of the publicity regarding the need for climate justice
provisions has already taken hold in international climate diplomacy. In
December 2009, at the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol in Copenhagen, climate justice concerns were considered as
part of the negotiation for the provisions of the Copenhagen Accord. For
example, Article 1 of the Accord provides, “We recognize the critical
impacts of climate change and the potential impacts of response
measures on countries particularly vulnerable to its adverse effects and
stress the need to establish a comprehensive adaptation programme
including international support.”374 The Accord also establishes specific
mechanisms to promote climate change adaptation assistance to
vulnerable populations. For example, Article 6 recognizes the crucial
role of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
(REDD) to “enable the mobilization of financial resources from
developed countries” to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions.375 In
369. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4.
370. See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370f (2006).
371. See DINAH SHELTON & ALEXANDRE KISS, JUDICIAL HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
38 (2005).
372. For example, seven of the twelve articles of the Copenhagen Accord address the role of
developing nations or the adaptation needs of populations most vulnerable to climate change. See
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4, arts. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10.
373. See generally Chukwumerije Okereke & Heike Schroeder, How Can Justice, Development,
and Climate Change Mitigation Be Reconciled for Developing Countries in a Post-Kyoto
Settlement?, 1 CLIMATE & DEV. 10 (2009); Mark Stallworthy, Environmental Justice Imperatives
for an Era of Climate Change, 36 J. L. & SOC’Y 55 (2009).
374. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4, art. 1.
375. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4, art. 6. For a critique of the adequacy of the REDD
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addition, Article 8 calls for thirty billion dollars for the period 2010–
2012 in adaptation funding from the developed countries to the “most
vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries,
small island developing States and Africa.”376 Article 8 further calls for
100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address developing countries’
efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.377
But Copenhagen was a disappointment to many who sought stronger
protections for vulnerable populations.378 First, the Accord is only a
political agreement—the hope to negotiate a binding treaty text at
Copenhagen was abandoned as impossible prior to the start of the
meeting.379 The international community now seeks to negotiate such a
binding text at the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 16) in
Mexico City in 2010. Second, the negotiations were highly contentious,
largely because the developing countries were dissatisfied with the
mitigation and adaptation proposals that the developed countries were
offering.380 Finally, the Accord’s final language lacked any reference to
“human rights” and existing human rights obligations set forth in other
international treaties and instruments.381 For a post-Kyoto treaty to fully
respond to the climate-change-adaptation era of the present, a marriage
of international environmental law and international human rights must
occur in that treaty’s text.382 Anything less would further victimize
vulnerable populations who lie in the path of devastating climate change
impacts.
Despite its shortcomings, the Copenhagen Accord reflects an
important paradigm shift in the international community’s approach to
language in the Copenhagen Accord, see REDD May Yet Survive Copenhagen Failures,
CARBONPOSITIVE.NET,
Dec.
21,
2009,
http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx
?articleID=1786, and see also Chris Lang, What Came out of Copenhagen on REDD?, Dec. 22,
2009, http://www.redd-monitor.org/2009/12/22/what-came-out-of-copenhagen-on-redd/.
376. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4, art. 8.
377. Id.
378. See Media Release, Inuit Tapirit Kanatami, Copenhagen Accord Excludes Inuit but Contains
Promise of Hope, (Dec. 21, 2009), http://www.itk.ca/media-centre/media-releases/copenhagenaccord-excludes-inuit-contains-promise-hope.
379. See Suzanne Goldenberg & John Vidal, US Scales Down Hopes of Global Climate Change
Treaty
in
Copenhagen,
GUARDIAN,
Nov.
4,
2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2009/nov/04/us-climate-change-copenhagen-treaty.
380. See Mohammed Abdul Baten, Whither Agreements?, DAILY STAR, Nov. 7, 2009,
http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=112961.
381. See generally Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4.
382. See generally Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for
Political Action, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439 (2009) (discussing UN Human Rights Council
Resolution 7/23, which recognizes that climate change has human rights implications).
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climate change as compared to the existing approach in the Kyoto
Protocol. While climate change mitigation strategies remain important,
they are no longer the exclusive focus of international climate change
regulation. The text of the Copenhagen Accord is laced with urgency
regarding the need to implement meaningful climate change adaptation
measures for vulnerable populations.383
But the Copenhagen Accord is only a small step forward. The climate
justice field, both domestically and internationally, needs to build on the
progress from Copenhagen and develop action mechanisms and
affirmative rights for these vulnerable populations to ensure that their
interests are given top priority as the international community confronts
the daunting challenges posed by climate change in the decades to come.
Formally recognizing the need for action is an indispensable first step.
But the devil is in the details and the needs of vulnerable populations
must come first in moving forward. Human rights impact assessments384
and actionable individual rights as part of a post-Kyoto regime on
climate change are examples of a new, human-centered strategy to
combat international environmental problems. Treaty-based protections
addressing climate change can no longer focus exclusively on state
sovereignty and protection of natural resources. The focus now must
shift to ensure protection of vulnerable populations affected by climate
change.
Perhaps the most shocking illustration of this need for enhanced
protections for vulnerable populations is in the Maldives, a country that
faces certain inundation from sea level rise within decades unless drastic
mitigation and adaptation measures are undertaken very soon. This crisis
383. See, e.g., Copenhagen Accord, supra note 4, art. 1 (“We recognize the critical impacts of
climate change and the potential impacts of response measures on countries particularly vulnerable
to its adverse effects and stress the need to establish a comprehensive adaptation programme
including international support.”); id. art. 3 (“Enhanced action and international cooperation on
adaptation is urgently required to ensure the implementation of the Convention by enabling and
supporting the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building
resilience in developing countries . . . . ”).
384. Like an environmental impact assessment under NEPA, a human rights impact assessment is
a “proactive procedural mechanism that evaluates human rights threats posed by climate change
impacts before permanent adverse impacts are experienced.” Randall S. Abate, Climate Change, the
United States, and the Impacts of Arctic Melting: A Case Study in the Need for Enforceable
International Environmental Human Rights, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 71 (2007). This mechanism
“seeks to prevent abuses, improve policy, increase corporate accountability, and ultimately to
increase knowledge of and respect for human rights.” Id. (citing Diana Bronson, Coordinator,
Globalisation and Human Rights, Presentation to the Parliamentary Subcommittee on Human
Rights and International Development and Canadian Investment: Human Rights as Due Diligence
(June 1, 2005) available at http://:www.dd-rd.ca/site/what-we-do/index/.php?subsection=documents
&lang=en&id=1610).
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is compellingly conveyed through the eloquent words of the President of
the Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, in his inaugural address to the
“Climate Vulnerable Forum” meeting on November 9, 2009.385
We gather in this hall today, as some of the most climatevulnerable nations on Earth.
We are vulnerable because climate change threatens to hit us
first; and hit us hardest.
And we are vulnerable because we have modest means with
which to protect ourselves from the coming disaster.
We are a diverse group of countries.
But we share one common enemy.
For us, climate change is no distant or abstract threat; but a clear
and present danger to our survival.
***
We are the frontline states in the climate change battle.
***
So what can we do about it?
***
Members of the G8 rich countries have pledged to halt
temperature rises to two degrees Celsius.
Yet they have refused to commit to the carbon targets, which
would deliver even this modest goal.
***
At two degrees my country would not survive.
As a president I cannot accept this.
***
I refuse to believe that it is too late. . .
Copenhagen is our date with destiny.386
If the Copenhagen Accord represents the outcome of these nations’
“date with destiny,” there is little hope for these nations’ survival in the
coming decades. These “frontline” nations must press for more
comprehensive and aggressive mechanisms to authorize climate justice
relief in both domestic and internationals law instruments and forums.
385. For a compelling account of the desperate situation that the Maldives now confronts in the
face of rising sea levels caused by climate change, see Nicholas Schmidle, Wanted: A New Home
for My Country, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, May 10, 2009, at 38.
386. Mohamed Nasheed, President of the Maldives, Inaugural Address to the Climate Vulnerable
Forum (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://bdpollution.blogspot.com/2009/11/climate-vulnerableforum-maldives.html.
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CONCLUSION
Regardless of the ultimate outcomes in the public nuisance cases for
climate change impacts in U.S. federal courts, this litigation strategy has
been an enormous step forward in the climate justice movement. It has
drawn attention to vulnerable populations that have been victimized by
climate change impacts and it has underscored the urgent need for a
viable remedy. These cases were well-timed in that each drew attention
to these issues at a critical juncture in the international diplomacy on
climate change law and policy in the negotiations leading up to
Copenhagen. Developing nations’ need for mitigation and adaptation
measures have taken center stage in the post-Kyoto era, and negotiating
a viable system of compensation for victims of climate change impacts
will be an indispensable component of these negotiations in the years
ahead. Of course, the nature and degree of these remedies will continue
to be tested in domestic courts and in international negotiation sessions.
Ken Alex, Supervising Deputy Attorney General for the State of
California and counsel for the plaintiffs in California v. General Motors
Corp., has faith in the promise of public nuisance and other common law
remedies to effect change and promote justice for victims of
environmental problems. He writes:
But in many ways, this environmental challenge is no different
from the clouds of ‘sulphurous acid gas’ streaming from the
stacks of Tennessee copper companies into Georgia a century
ago, where the federal common law rose to protect the interests
of the harmed state. The genius of environmental common law
is its ability to address new pollution problems using longestablished principles validated by decades of judicial precedent
to effect sometimes profound changes. The challenge for
attorneys handling today’s innovative cases is how to best use
those common law tools to reach beyond the constraints of
current politics to a new era of responsibility and hope.387
The Kivalina case, and a narrow class of future cases like it, could be the
bridge toward an era of increased hope for the victims of climate change
impacts and a transition toward increased responsibility for the public
and private entities that are principally responsible for those harms.

387. Kenneth P. Alex, California’s Global Warming Lawsuit: The Case for Damages, in
CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 165, 171 (Clifford
Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini, eds., 2007) (citations omitted).

